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man. "See I have set before thee this day life and good, and death and evil, therefore, choose life that thou and thy seed may live,"—when this challenge comes to us, it is simply our character and total personal genius that are on trial; and if we invoke any so-called philosophy, our choice and use of that also are but revelations of our individual aptitude or incapacity for moral life. From this unsparing practical ordeal no professor's lectures and no array of books can save us. The solving word for the learned and the unlearned man alike lies, in the last resort, in the dumb willingnesses and unwillingnesses of their interiors, and nowhere else. It is not in heaven, neither is it beyond the sea. But the word is very nigh unto thee, in thy mouth and in thy heart that thou mayest do it.

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ANOTHER VIEW OF THE ETHICS OF LAND-TENURE.

THE well-written essay by Professor Clark, in the first number of this review, on the ethics of land-tenure, is of special interest, on account of the contrast between his views and those of Mr. George, the most prominent of the opponents of the present system of land-tenure. Before, however, judging of the right and wrong of our present system of land-tenure, as presented by these writers, it is necessary to analyze the position of each to see upon what kind of an economic system they base their doctrines. It is plain that they have economic worlds in mind, which are radically different from one another, and naturally the ethical judgments which they make respecting these worlds are very different.

It seems to me that both Professor Clark and Mr. George are seeking for an ethical judgment rather than for the ethical principle upon which judgments should be based. The real question is to find the ethical principle upon which the ethical judgment should rest. To do this successfully the

economic parts of the controversy should be separated from the ethical and discussed by themselves. The method of reasoning upon ethical problems has not been so thoroughly discussed as the method of reasoning fitted for economic problems, yet it seems to me that as they are nearly related sciences the method of procedure must be quite similar.

In order to consider the ethical problem clearly it must be isolated from other problems. We must have a case where no other consideration influences our judgment. In stating the evils of our land laws as strongly as Mr. George does, there is no opportunity offered for discussing ethical feelings by themselves. With the facts as he puts them, not merely the moral feelings would revolt against our present system of land-tenure, but also our economic and political judgments as well. He thinks our whole civilization is at stake; that there is no other remedy for our present evils but a radical change in our system of land-tenure; that if this one evil were removed, all other evils would disappear of themselves; that no progress can be made without the change he advocates, and that there is no other remedy but the one he has in mind.

Under such a combination of circumstances we cannot measure moral considerations separately. So many different considerations come in to influence our judgment, that these different feelings are commingled in a common result. To illustrate, let us take the case of the late war. How can we judge of the strength of the moral feeling which prompted men to free the slaves when so many other issues were involved in the war. Many advocated the war on account of a desire to hold the Union together; in the Western States the people desired to have the Mississippi River as an outlet for their goods to the ocean; some wanted a Southern market for manufactures, and many other considerations might be mentioned, which led people to desire to continue the war until the end. All of these considerations, to a greater or less degree, influenced each individual. How, then, can we determine under such complicated circumstances what was the influence of any one motive in the common result that led to the con-

tinuation of the war until the end? Is it not clear that we can find no definite measure of the strength of any of these motives?

It thus seems to me that in a case like that presented by Mr. George, he does not give us the proper background from which we can determine what is the moral principle which we should use in considering such cases. We must test our principle in some other case where circumstances have isolated it from other causes, and in this way allow its measurement.

Professor Clark, I think, errs in the opposite direction to Mr. George. He makes the economic conditions that justify our present system of land-tenure so prominent that the reader will at least be uncertain whether any moral principle is involved. According to the economic data he presents, rent in the economic sense, if not wholly disregarded, at least receives no emphasis. Land seems to be a form of capital, its value like other property being due to the labor put upon it. He also contends that the landless man has no grievance unless it be in his lack of wealth. He even claims our land system instead of lowering wages really raises them. No one will deny that there is much truth in the position he takes; yet if he is entirely in the right, land-tenure is wholly an economic problem and involves no moral principle.

For these reasons I think that neither Mr. George nor Professor Clark proceed on the proper plan to bring out clearly the ethical principles that apply to land-tenures. To do this we must first correlate the economic facts so that they will show the need of an application of the moral law, and then we must look for an ethical principle that will satisfy our moral feelings. The economic principles must be discussed by themselves and then accepted as data when the discussion turns upon ethical principles.

THE ECONOMIC DATA.

In bringing together the economic data that are needed as a basis of the discussion of the facts of land-tenure, we need, first of all, a clear idea of what is meant by unearned increment or surplus value. The unearned increment is that

which comes to individuals or to classes, not from industrial qualities which they use in production, but from the lack of supply of some needed article. If a producer could sell an article for a dollar, at the usual rate of interest and wages, and the lack of supply was so great as to regularly give him a dollar and a quarter for the article, the twenty-five cents are unearned. Although the case of land is not the only example where there is an unearned increment, because the price of food is always more than its cost of production on the best land, yet it is the best example, and hence is the one in common use as an illustration. On account of differences in soil, farms have different degrees of fertility, and hence the return for the labor employed upon them is greater in some fields than in others. With the increase in the demand for food, coming through the increase in population, poorer lands are brought into use, and, as a result, a continually higher price must be paid for food, giving to the owners of the better soil a price far above the cost of production.

By thinking in a more general way we get at the idea of surplus value. If the value of all the produce of the industry of a given society is greater to the people as consumers than its cost was to them as producers, the difference between the cost and value is the surplus value. There could be, for example, no rent of land, if we did not estimate the value of all wheat produced more highly than we estimate the pain and trouble of producing it. The problem of distribution then is, who shall get this surplus value.*

There are two causes which give rise to an economic surplus, in as far as it comes from an unequal distribution, one of which is subjective, and the other objective. The objective cause lies in the differences in the return obtained from various instruments of production used by men, and of these differences, the differences in land forms the best and clearest example. The subjective cause lies in the difference in the urgency of wants that different classes of laborers supply.

To illustrate my meaning here will require more space than

* See the writer's "Stability of Prices," Sections 4 and 5.

that showing the objective cause, because it is not so fully understood. Our wants vary greatly in intensity; some objects being necessities are, for personal consumption, valued much more highly than others that are merely comforts or luxuries. Besides this, the first part of any commodity supplied to us is estimated much more highly than any subsequent part.* As our wants become more fully supplied, the pleasure we derive from the commodity gradually decreases until we no longer derive any pleasure from its consumption. As an outcome of this law of consumption, the increased production of any article always leads to the lowering of its price, and those who produce for an overstocked market must always sell their goods at a continually lowering price. Kansas farmers, for example, get a low price for their wheat, because the additional supply which they bring upon the overstocked market must be used to supply those wants which are less intense than a more limited amount of wheat would supply, and so long as our wants are quite fully supplied, the price of wheat will be so low that many farmers can scarcely make a living.

As a result of the division of labor society is divided into two parts,—men with economic instincts and those who lack these instincts. Those who save or have faculties needed to organize our great industries become capitalists and employers, while the laboring classes having their industrial qualities less fully developed must follow manual occupations. The laboring classes are thus in a highly developed social organism dependent upon the higher classes. They get work, not by the direct utilization of natural forces, as is the case in a simpler social organism, but by supplying the wants of the higher classes. With every increase in population a greater economy of labor and natural forces must be made, in order to supply the increased demand for food and other commodities, and, as a result, the laborers become more dependent upon the higher classes, who have the industrial

* See the article by Professor Böhm-Bawerk in vol. i., No. 3, of the "Annals of the American Academy."

qualities needed to increase production as rapidly as population increases. A growing nation can continue progressive only by placing its industries more completely under the control of the intelligent classes, yet out of this increased control grow the evils of distribution. The laborers now get their living, not as before direct from nature, but by supplying the wants of the higher classes. In any society where the laborers are increasing more rapidly than the employing classes, the additional laborers get work only by supplying the less intense wants of the higher classes who control and organize industrial forces. There will thus be a constant tendency towards a lower rate of wages, because some of the laborers will be engaged in producing articles which supply wants of the higher classes of so little value to them that only a low rate of wages can be paid. No one will give more for an article than the pleasure he gets from it, and wages must fall when the public are so well supplied with commodities that the consumption of quantities will give them but little pleasure.*

An increase in the number of laborers, therefore, in any occupation, tends to lower the wages of laborers, because these additional laborers bring upon the market an additional supply of goods, which must be used to supply the wants of consumers less intense than the wants supplied by the previous laborers who are producing the same commodities. Suppose, for example, an additional one hundred men should wish to get work of an employer, who already had one hundred men and one hundred thousand dollars capital. He must now save another one hundred thousand dollars in order to employ them. With the return which he obtained from the first one hundred thousand dollars he saved he supplied his most intense wants, and if he is to employ and save another hundred thousand dollars, he would only do it to supply his less intense wants,—such as are not already supplied. He will not supply these less intense wants unless the men will work for less wages. The additional one hundred

* Compare with chapter viii. in the writer's "Economic Basis of Protection."

men, therefore, will be compelled to work for lower wages, and as these laborers are working for lower wages, the wages of the first one hundred men will also be reduced by a like amount. Competition brings all wages down to a level.

The present evils of distribution come thus from two distinct sources and not from one as Mr. George supposes. The man without land is usually the man without economic instincts, and in this way the two phases of the problem are really united in one, yet we do wrong to so confuse the two sources of unequal distribution of wealth, in a way that would make it appear that all of our present evils come from one cause. Unless these causes are counteracted by other tendencies, with every increase of that part of population with undeveloped economic instincts, a greater part of the whole agricultural production goes into the hands of the landed classes. In working also for their employers having capital and intelligence, the new laborers will supply the less urgent wants of these employers, and thus they must work for less to get the higher classes to save the additional capital and to use the additional intelligence needed to manage larger and more complicated businesses. The surplus value, or as it is often called the unearned increment, is due to the combination of these two causes, and it increases when there is an increase of differences in men and in land. Make the differences between the higher and lower classes in society greater than they now are, and the surplus will grow; make the differences in the fertility of land greater than they now are, and for this reason also the surplus will grow.

It must not, however, be inferred that the whole surplus is greater because it comes from two sources than if it comes from one. The social conditions that increase the one, decrease the other. Differences in land are prominent in the early stages of social development when differences in men are small. The gradual increase in intelligence reduces the differences in land by making poor land better land, but at the same time through the more rapid progress of the higher classes differences in men increase. The two causes acting at

the same time do not make matters worse. The changes in their relative importance merely changes the direction of the distribution of the surplus. It is, therefore, a popular error to suppose that the rent of land absorbs the whole of this surplus. According to the Ricardian theory of distribution, this would be so, but this theory gives an undue emphasis to land as an economic factor. It regards all the produce as being distributed into interest, wages, or rent, and hence as interest and wages are kept down by competition, it is argued that all of the surplus will go to the landlords as rent. The surplus, however, may be absorbed in many ways, of which I shall mention a few. Our railroads are now getting a large share of this surplus. As the owners of farms are separated from the market of their produce by long distances, they must make use of our railroad system to transport their grain. Any increase in the rates of transportation, therefore, will act as a reduction of rent, and if the railroad system of our country has its stock largely watered, it will reduce the value and rent of lands, and in this way a large portion of the surplus will go to the owners of railroads, rather than to the owners of land.

The same general reasoning will show that trusts take their profits from this surplus. If the price of the articles which farmers buy is raised through a combination of the producers of these articles, there will be correspondingly lower profits upon farms, and as a result, lower rents. Every trust, or combination, therefore, tends to transfer a considerable share of the surplus or unearned increment from the owners of land to the owners of other monopolies.

In addition to this we have another portion absorbed by the waste of trade, especially in the retail trade. Retail prices are much further separated from wholesale prices than they were in former times. We cannot here enter into a detailed discussion of the causes of this change, but from our previous reasoning it is plain that if retail prices rise or the waste of trade is increased, a portion of the surplus is absorbed in this way, and that the whole amount going to other classes is reduced to a like amount. The increase of taxation acts in a

like manner.* The government thus secures a share of the increase of productive power of the nation, which goes to increase the surplus so long as the social conditions are such that competition tends to keep wages at a minimum. I call attention to these different forms the surplus may take because of the theory of Mr. George, which supposes that we can secure all the surplus if we would only seize the rent of land. We might in this way get only a small portion of it. The rent of agricultural land seems to decrease, relatively at least, with the advance in civilization, and hence a larger portion of the surplus is absorbed in other ways.

I have used the term surplus so as to avoid a statement that would lead to the wrong inference, that the landlords as a class get all the other classes lose. I have stated as clearly as possible the tendency through which wages are kept at a minimum, so that we can clearly see where the moral problem lies, and also that we may have a hypothetical case in which this problem is isolated from the other problems. I do not mean, however, to assert that these tendencies act unimpeded, and that the results are as detrimental to society as these premises alone would indicate. On the contrary, I regard the conclusions of Mr. George, and others who reason as he does, as being very defective. There are many opposing tendencies which keep by far the greater part of the increase of produce from going out of the hands of the workmen. While these opposing tendencies prevent the situation from being as bad as Mr. George represents, yet they are not strong enough to prevent the growth of that surplus which creates a moral problem demanding solution.

If no surplus goes to the monopolies or to privileged classes, then there is no ethical problem involved, in land tenures. If some of it goes in this way, then the ethical problem is the same as if all of the produce of industry above a minimum of wages went to increase the surplus. To measure the amount of the surplus is an economic problem that does not concern us at present. We want merely to discover

* See the writer's "Principles of Rational Taxation."

the ethical principle upon which we should act, when economic causes to any degree create a surplus and lower the wages of the less fortunate parts of society, who lack the intelligence and perhaps the power to utilize the natural forces about them.

THE ETHICAL PRINCIPLE.

We now have the economic facts that lie at the basis of the ethical problem of land-tenures. What ethical principles should we accept to bring our actions into harmony with the moral law? The first principle that we must face is involved in the doctrine advocated by Professor Clark, that each workingman under a perfect competitive law gets what he produces, and thus that the ethical standard of wages is the standard that society tends to realize in fact. He measures the earnings of each man by what society would lose, if he were to stop working and continue eating. This amount gauges his value and tends under natural law to gauge his pay.*

At first glance this doctrine seems just, yet it will not stand a careful analysis. Beneath the surface lie hidden certain economic facts, to which we have already called attention, and when their bearing is seen, the ethical correctness of this doctrine is at least an open question.

To illustrate, suppose that the land of a country was of four grades, and that upon the best land each workman could raise 400 bushels of wheat; on the second class 375 bushels; on the third class 350 bushels; while on the poorest land only 325 bushels could be obtained for a year's work. So long as only the best land was in use, each laborer would get all he produced, 400 bushels; but as soon as the second class of land is brought into use, the laborer on the best land no longer gets all he produces. He is paid only the value of 375 bushels, the amount earned by each laborer on the second grade of land. Now a laborer is worth to society the value of 375 bushels of wheat, and where the third grade of land comes into use the value of a laborer sinks to that of 350

* See Professor Clark's article on the "Law of Wages and Interest," in the "Annals of the American Academy," vol. i., No. 1.

bushels, and finally when the poorest land comes into use, the labor of a workman is worth to society no more than 325 bushels of wheat. Upon this plan of estimating the value of a workman to society, his value depends not on the value of what he creates, but on what is created by the least efficient workman with whom he has to compete. Nor are the workmen as a class valued at what they as a class add to the wealth of society. While four workmen—one on each grade of land—produce 1450 bushels, they get but 1300 bushels. Surely this method does not give to each man his whole product. These laborers take 1300 bushels from the social store, but would any one say that they put only this amount in it? Or to put the case in another way, some one takes out the 150 bushels that the laborers do not get, and what has he put in the social store to make an equivalent for it?

When the second grade of land is brought into cultivation, and the laborer on the best land finds he no longer gets the 400 bushels to which he was formerly entitled, has he not a moral right to complain that the burden arising from a social change is put entirely upon his shoulders, which society ought to distribute among all its members? Society has grown, and from this growth there follow certain advantages and certain disadvantages. In the advantages he does not share, or at most to a less degree than the other classes, while he is made to bear the disadvantage that the use of less productive land brings.

The defect of the reasoning of Professor Clark comes from overlooking one of the two agents by which wealth is created. If all wealth was produced by labor alone, then the value of a workman to society would be a just measure of the claim that each workman has upon the wealth that society has to distribute. But nature helps in the production of wealth as well as man, and at the end of each productive period society has to distribute the wealth produced by men, plus the wealth produced by nature. To illustrate, in the case of land, the poorest land means the land where nature does the least to aid man to produce food. The

measure of the differences in soil is the difference in the aid of nature in production. If on the poorest land a man can raise 325 bushels of wheat, while on the best he can raise 400 bushels, the aid of nature on the best land is greater than that given to the poorest land by the equivalent of 75 bushels. In our former illustration the four men aided by nature produced 1450 bushels of wheat, of which 150 bushels is due to the greater aid that nature gave on the better land. And if society measured the value of each man by what that man produces who is aided the least by nature,—the economic measure of value of workmen,—then there is a surplus in the social storehouse equal to the greater aid that nature gives to all the better land and other productive agents. The difference between the better coal and iron mines, water-powers, and other natural resources, and the poorest of these in use, is due to nature, and a value equal to the sum of them all would remain in the social store after the just claims of all workers are settled, if we are to decide that the claims of each workman are equal to what society would lose if he stopped working and continued eating.

In short, it seems to me that the doctrine of Professor Clark, if carried out logically, would deny that the laborers have any right to share in the natural resources of the country.* With every increase of the number of workmen, some of them work under conditions where they get less aid from nature, and if the value of each man is fixed by what society would lose if he ceased to work, then the value of all the laborers is equal to what they could produce, if all of them worked on as poor land or with as poor instruments of production as the few laborers use that are at the margin of cultivation. All the increase of wealth due to fertile fields or productive mines would be taken gradually from workmen with the growth of population, and given to more favored persons whose shares are not reduced by the use of poorer land. These privileged classes would then enjoy all the

* See the writer's "Economic Basis of Protection," chap. vii.

advantages due to better natural resources or to more productive instruments of other kinds. When it is said that the workingman under these conditions gets all he is worth to society, the term "society," if analyzed, means only the more favored classes who are contrasted with the workmen. They pay each laborer only the utility of the last laborer to them, and get the whole produce of the nation minus this amount.

After each producer has obtained from the social store a value equal to what he has produced, according to the standard of Professor Clark, the store would not be empty. It would still contain the wealth due to superior natural resources and to superior productive instruments. We thus have a surplus that society must in some way dispose of. To whom it shall go depends upon the laws and usages of each nation. Our present laws allow a large part of it to go to the owners of natural resources. This disposition I believe to be a wise one,—not that it gives ideal justice, but because it gives greater prosperity and security than any other disposition would give. Rent is obtained by owners of land, not as a right based on economic considerations, but as a premium given by society to secure progress out of a fund to which its claim is superior to that of any individual.

While the good of the whole society must rank higher than that of classes or of individuals, yet it is morally wrong to overlook or disguise the injury to the few that is bound up in the welfare of the many. The growth of society in wealth and numbers is the best indication of prosperity, but this increase of wealth and numbers often makes the man without wealth and land less productive, because he must use poorer land or less productive instruments. His share of the common stock is thus reduced to the advantage of those who have better land or other natural resources. He perhaps gets all he is "worth" to society, but he certainly gets but little of the increase of wealth due to the aid of nature or to superior instruments of production.

In a case of this kind I take it that our moral instincts, if not clouded by other considerations, would recognize the

right of the workman to compensation, and as he has lost through social changes that add to the wealth and prosperity of society, he should look to society and not to individuals for a remedy. His loss is not a robbery by individuals. There is no particular field to which he has a special claim. He has lost nothing that he could properly seize wherever he finds it, as he could in the case of a theft. To what bushel of grain or pound of cotton or iron has he a legal or moral right superior to the present possessor? His loss is not of that kind. It is due to social changes, and society and not individuals should right his wrongs.

So much, it seems to me, is due to those who have lost through those industrial changes that have brought social progress, and nothing short of a full recompense will give complete justice; yet in giving justice society has certain rights that must not be lost sight of. While society must return the value to the injured classes, it can justly choose the concrete form in which the return shall be made. His right is to a given value, a certain quantity of wealth, but not to specific goods. The claim rests on a loss of general well-being, and not on a loss of money or of particular commodities. Society should put the claimant on a par with his former condition of prosperity, but it can assume what part of his former expenses it will, or it can improve his productive power, so as to allow him to increase his income to his former figure. If a laborer loses twenty dollars a year by a social change, he is restored to his former condition, if the state pays twenty dollars of his school bills, or if it improves his sanitary condition so that he pays less doctor bills to that amount. He would also be put on his former footing, if the streets were improved so that he could live in places with lower rent, or if the cost of transportation was reduced so that he could get his food and fuel more cheaply.

In short, the state may settle the claims against it that arise from evils connected with industrial changes by any of the hundred ways at its command, and it has the right to decide which way it will take. The principle I wish to bring out may be stated thus: *if social changes take from the laborer*

by making him worth less to society, state activity should be increased enough to compensate him. Through the activity of the state and that of the individual the latter must have his wants as well supplied as before the change. The direction of the state activity, however, must be controlled by the general welfare of society, and not be determined by the will of those classes for whose benefit the state is acting.

After the state has settled its accounts with those who have lost through the changes due to social progress, it must look to the holders of the unearned increment, and to those who have special gains from other sources, for funds to pay these claims against it. The expense of the increased state activity through which the injured classes are to be restored to their former condition should be borne by those who have profited from the prosperity of society. The position of the state in this matter is similar to that of a city in a suit for damage because of a defective sidewalk. The injured citizen has no action against the owner of the adjacent property, whose duty it was to keep the sidewalk in repair. He must sue the city, and then the city must look for compensation to the owner of the property. The state has always made use of the right to put special taxes on those who have special advantages, and it would only be a further extension of a well-organized principle, if the cost of improving the condition of the lower classes was placed upon those whose incomes grow because of social progress.

While I admit the justice of a more extended use of this principle, yet, in its application, we should proceed with extreme caution, because so many other elements come in to complicate the solution. The need of making special assessments upon those who gain most by the progress of society depends upon the incidence of taxation. We must first know who will bear a tax before we discuss who ought to bear it. A full discussion of this complicated subject would carry us back into the field of economics and away from the purpose of this essay. It is, however, a crude economic theory that asserts that all taxes on commodities fall upon laborers, and that there is no way of reaching the unearned increment but

by direct taxes on land. To tax the sources from which the unearned income arises may have the same effect as to tax the land itself. If all the benefit of improved production goes to landlords, it would seem that the state, by taking in any form a part of these results of improved productions, would reduce the share of the landlords and not that of the other classes. Be this as it may, it serves to illustrate the difficulties of a solution, and why economists cannot accept so simple a theory of taxation, as Mr. George and his friends would have them do.

The discussion of land-tenure involves two classes of problems,—the economic and the moral. The moral principle is simple, and the confusion we find comes solely from a commingling of economic and moral data. Get the economic data once clearly before a person, and his ethical judgment would be quickly made. The economic data, however, are difficult and complicated, and no discussion upon them is worthy of attention that is not the result of careful study. The trouble in the discussion comes from crude economic theories, through which the economic principles are made to seem as simple as the ethical principles really are.

It is not difficult to see that there is a surplus or unearned increment. It is still more easy to see that those who lose by social changes accompanying progress deserve a compensation. But when we seek to discover how this surplus is distributed and who enjoy it, or how taxes can be levied so as to fall upon the holders of this surplus, we strike a difficult problem.

The present evils from which the lower classes suffer are not due to land-tenures, but to the passive policy of the state through which these classes have been neglected. Had the state done its duty in elevating those classes deficient in industrial qualities, there would have been no bad results from the free sale of land. We want a low price of food and not a large public revenue from land. When our farmers become more intelligent and our laborers better consumers, its price will be so low that the unearned increment will be unworthy of notice, and no one will care to disturb land-tenures to secure so small a sum.

The knowledge of a surplus and the acknowledgment of the right of laborers to compensation for the evils from which they suffer, do not, therefore, involve any reversal of the present policy of the state either as to the lines of its activity or of taxation. State activity must, however, be extended to new fields and made more efficient within its present limits. We must also become more conscientious in fulfilling our duties to the lower classes, and more earnest in our endeavor to make their lives worth living. It should also make us more willing to bear our share of the burden of taxation that must accompany any earnest effort for social reform. With the increase of our knowledge of the incidence of taxation, we can place its burden more completely upon those who profit by the increase of rent and other forms of unearned revenue; yet we must wait for the development of sound economic doctrine before taking many steps in this direction. By acting on crude economic theories we would probably check the progress of society, and especially of the working classes, more than we should by raising taxes according to our present methods.

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MORAL TALES.

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, in a recent number of his talks "Over the Tea-cups," quotes the words of Rogers, the poet: "When I hear a new book talked about or have it pressed upon me, I read an old one." Some such tendency to resist the interference of the outside world with our literary studies must have been experienced by many of us and perhaps of late years more especially. Mr. Gladstone cautions us all against the errors of "Robert Elsmere," and straightway we are implored on all sides to read the book. Cardinal Manning and the Archbishop of Canterbury appeal to us in the railway station advertisements to read "Looking Backward." A few