

**VIOLENCE IN THE CITY --  
AN END OR A BEGINNING?**



A REPORT BY THE GOVERNOR'S  
COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES RIOTS

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December 2, 1965

## GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES RIOTS

P.O. BOX 54708, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90054



CHAIRMAN  
Mr. John A. McCone  
VICE CHAIRMAN  
Mr. Warren M. Christopher  
MEMBERS  
Judge Earl C. Broady  
Mr. Asa V. Call  
The Very Rev. Charles S. Conzato  
The Rev. James Edward Jones  
Dr. Sherman M. Mellinkoff  
Mrs. Robert G. Neumann

December 2, 1965

Dear Governor Brown:

We herewith transmit the report of the Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots.

During the 100 days since you gave us our charge, our Commission has held 64 meetings during which we have received testimony and statements from administrators, law enforcement officers, and others of the State government, of Los Angeles County and city government, and of certain nearby cities also. Additionally, we have received information from representatives of business and labor, and residents of the area where the riots occurred as well as individuals who exercise leadership among these residents. We have heard spokesmen for the Mexican-American minority and social workers and others concerned with minority problems. We have engaged consultants and experts who have reported on particular areas of our concern. In addition, we and our staff have reviewed many reports on Negro problems prepared by government agencies, by universities, and by private institutions.

Transcripts of testimony, depositions, reports of interviews and staff and consultant studies all will be deposited in an appropriate public depository as soon as practicable so that these records can be available to those interested.

Our conclusions and our recommendations are the distillation of the information received from these sources, together with our own observations of existing physical and sociological conditions. We wish to emphasize that, in compliance with your directive, we have been absorbed in the study of the problems in our Negro community. However, we are deeply conscious that the Mexican-American community, which here is almost equal in size to the Negro community, suffers from similar and in some cases more severe handicaps than the Negro

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
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
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community. Also, we are mindful that there are many others within our community living in conditions of poverty and suffering from unemployment and incapacity. In designing programs to assist the Negro, the needs of others must not be overlooked.

We recommend that the Commission reconvene periodically to review actions taken to implement the recommendations in our report, with the next meeting to be held in the summer of 1966.

Respectfully,

  
John A. McCone, Chairman

  
Warren M. Christopher, Vice Chairman

  
Earl S. Broady, Member

  
Asa V. Call, Member

  
The Very Rev. Charles S. Conzato, Member

  
James E. Jones (M.D.),  
Reverend James Edward Jones, Member

  
Dr. Sherman M. Mellinkoff, Member

  
Mrs. Robert G. Neumann, Member

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## CHARGE OF GOVERNOR EDMUND G. BROWN TO THE COMMISSION (August 24, 1965)

Chairman McCone and distinguished members of the Commission:

In announcing a week ago that I would appoint a Commission of distinguished Californians to make an objective and dispassionate study of the Los Angeles riots, I emphasized that I would put no limits on the scope of the Commission's inquiries.

Nevertheless, since I was deeply engrossed in this subject almost constantly, day and night, during all of last week, I feel it may be useful if I set out some of the areas in which I hope the Commission will make inquiries and recommendations. In a sense, this is my charge as Governor, to the Commission.

First, I believe that the Commission should prepare an accurate chronology and description of the riots and attempt to draw any lessons which may be learned from a retrospective study of these events. The purpose of this would not be to fix blame or find scapegoats, but rather to develop a comprehensive and detailed chronology and description of the disorders. This should include, by way of example, a study of the following subjects:

- A. The circumstances surrounding the arrest which touched off the riots.
- B. Why the riots continued and spread, including whether there was any organization, leadership, or outside stimulation of the rioters.
- C. The efforts of law enforcement officials to control the riots.
- D. The action taken by private individuals, both white and Negro, as well as the leadership in organizations . . . within or without the troubled area . . . in attempting to control the riots.


- E. Events surrounding the ordering in of the National Guard.
- F. The action taken jointly by law enforcement officers and the National Guard to bring the riots under control.
- G. The circumstances surrounding the deaths which took place and a consideration of the personal injuries caused.
- H. The damage done to property by fires, force, and looting.
- I. The weapons used and how they were obtained.
- J. The disturbances of a similar nature in other Southern California areas at approximately the same time.
- K. The arrests, arraignments and trials of the persons apprehended during the riots.

Second, I believe that the Commission should probe deeply the immediate and underlying causes of the riots. In this connection, the Commission will want to consider the following:

- A. The physical and sociological condition in the area of the riots at the time they commenced.
- B. The opportunities for Negroes in employment, education, and recreation in the troubled area; and the attitude and awareness of the Negro community regarding those opportunities.
- C. The public and private welfare programs available and not available in the area and the extent to which they were utilized.
- D. Pertinent facts regarding the persons involved in the riots, including their age, education, job status, habits, family situation, and associations.
- E. The attitudes of the rioters toward the community and law enforcement officials in the community and whether these attitudes are supported by fact and reason.

- F. The significance of looting in stimulating and prolonging the riots.

Third, the Commission should develop recommendations for action designed to prevent a recurrence of these tragic disorders. The Commission should consider what additional can be done at any level of government or by any agency of the government to prevent a recurrence. Of equal importance, the Commission should consider whether there are steps which private citizens may take, individually or jointly, to prevent a repetition of the bloodshed.




## THE CRISIS — AN OVERVIEW

The rioting in Los Angeles in the late, hot summer of 1965 took six days to run its full grievous course. In hindsight, the tinder-igniting incident is seen to have been the arrest of a drunken Negro youth about whose dangerous driving another Negro had complained to the Caucasian motorcycle officer who made the arrest. The arrest occurred under rather ordinary circumstances, near but not in the district known as Watts, at seven o'clock on the evening of 11 August, a Wednesday. The crisis ended in the afternoon of 17 August, a Tuesday, on Governor Brown's order to lift the curfew which had been imposed the Saturday before in an extensive area just south of the heart of the City.

In the ugliest interval, which lasted from Thursday through Saturday, perhaps as many as 10,000 Negroes took to the streets in marauding bands. They looted stores, set fires, beat up white passersby whom they hauled from stopped cars, many of which were turned upside down and burned, exchanged shots with law enforcement officers, and stoned and shot at firemen. The rioters seemed to have been caught up in an insensate rage of destruction. By Friday, the disorder spread to adjoining areas, and ultimately an area covering 46.5 square miles had to be controlled with the aid of military authority before public order was restored.

The entire Negro population of Los Angeles County, about two thirds of whom live in this area, numbers more than 650,000. Observers estimate that only about two per cent were involved in the disorder. Nevertheless, this violent fraction, however minor, has given the face of community relations in Los Angeles a sinister cast.

When the spasm passed, thirty-four persons were dead, and the wounded and hurt numbered 1,032 more. Property damage was about \$40,000,000. Arrested for one crime or another were 3,952 persons,



women as well as men, including over 500 youths under eighteen. The lawlessness in this one segment of the metropolitan area had terrified the entire county and its 6,000,000 citizens.

**Sowing the Wind**

In the summer of 1964, Negro communities in seven eastern cities were stricken by riots.\* Although in each situation there were unique contributing circumstances not existing elsewhere, the fundamental causes were largely the same:

— Not enough jobs to go around, and within this scarcity not enough by a wide margin of a character which the untrained Negro could fill.

— Not enough schooling designed to meet the special needs of the disadvantaged Negro child, whose environment from infancy onward places him under a serious handicap.

— A resentment, even hatred, of the police, as the symbol of authority.

These riots were each a symptom of a sickness in the center of our cities. In almost every major city, Negroes pressing ever more densely into the central city and occupying areas from which Caucasians have moved in their flight to the suburbs have developed an isolated existence with a feeling of separation from the community as a whole.

\* SUMMARY OF 1964 RIOTS

City	Date	Killed	Injured	Arrests	Stores Damaged
New York City	July 18-23	1	144	519	541
Rochester	July 24-25	4	350	976	204
Jersey City	August 2-4	0	46	52	71
Paterson	August 11-13	0	8	65	20
Elizabeth	August 11-13	0	6	18	17
Chicago (Dixmoor)	August 16-17	0	57	80	2
Philadelphia	August 28-30	0	341	774	225

Many have moved to the city only in the last generation and are totally unprepared to meet the conditions of modern city life. At the core of the cities where they cluster, law and order have only tenuous hold; the conditions of life itself are often marginal; idleness leads to despair and finally, mass violence supplies a momentary relief from the malaise.

**Why Los Angeles?**

In Los Angeles, before the summer's explosion, there was a tendency to believe, and with some reason, that the problems which caused the trouble elsewhere were not acute in this community. A "statistical portrait" drawn in 1964 by the Urban League which rated American cities in terms of ten basic aspects of Negro life — such as housing, employment, income — ranked Los Angeles first among the sixty-eight cities that were examined. ("There is no question about it, this is the best city in the world," a young Negro leader told us with respect to housing for Negroes.)

While the Negro districts of Los Angeles are not urban gems, neither are they slums. Watts, for example, is a community consisting mostly of one and two-story houses, a third of which are owned by the occupants. In the riot area, most streets are wide and usually quite clean; there are trees, parks, and playgrounds. A Negro in Los Angeles has long been able to sit where he wants in a bus or a movie house, to shop where he wishes, to vote, and to use public facilities without discrimination. The opportunity to succeed is probably unequaled in any other major American city.

Yet the riot did happen here, and there are special circumstances here which explain in part why it did. Perhaps the people of Los Angeles should have seen trouble gathering under the surface calm. In the last quarter century, the Negro population here has exploded. While the County's population has trebled, the Negro population has increased almost tenfold from 75,000 in 1940 to 650,000 in 1965.

Much of the increase came through migration from Southern states and many arrived with the anticipation that this dynamic city would somehow spell the end of life's endless problems. To those who have come with high hopes and great expectations and see the success of others so close at hand, failure brings a special measure of frustration and disillusionment. Moreover, the fundamental problems, which are the same here as in the cities which were racked by the 1964 riots, are intensified by what may well be the least adequate network of public transportation in any major city in America.

Looking back, we can also see that there was a series of aggravating events in the twelve months prior to the riots.

— Publicity given to the glowing promise of the Federal poverty program was paralleled by reports of controversy and bickering over the mechanism to handle the program here in Los Angeles, and when the projects did arrive, they did not live up to their press notices.

— Throughout the nation, unpunished violence and disobedience to law were widely reported, and almost daily there were exhortations, here and elsewhere, to take the most extreme and even illegal remedies to right a wide variety of wrongs, real and supposed.

— In addition, many Negroes here felt and were encouraged to feel that they had been affronted by the passage of Proposition 13 — an initiative measure passed by two-thirds of the voters in November 1964 which repealed the Rumford Fair Housing Act and unless modified by the voters or invalidated by the courts will bar any attempt by state or local governments to enact similar laws.

When the rioting came to Los Angeles, it was not a race riot in the usual sense. What happened was an explosion — a formless, quite

senseless, all but hopeless violent protest — engaged in by a few but bringing great distress to all.

Nor was the rioting exclusively a projection of the Negro problem. It is part of an American problem which involves Negroes but which equally concerns other disadvantaged groups. In this report, our major conclusions and recommendations regarding the Negro problem in Los Angeles apply with equal force to the Mexican-Americans, a community which is almost equal in size to the Negro community and whose circumstances are similarly disadvantageous and demand equally urgent treatment. That the Mexican-American community did not riot is to its credit; it should not be to its disadvantage.

### The Dull Devastating Spiral of Failure

In examining the sickness in the center of our city, what has depressed and stunned us most is the dull, devastating spiral of failure that awaits the average disadvantaged child in the urban core. His home life all too often fails to give him the incentive and the elementary experience with words and ideas which prepares most children for school. Unprepared and unready, he may not learn to read or write at all; and because he shares his problem with 30 or more in the same classroom, even the efforts of the most dedicated teachers are unavailing. Age, not achievement, passes him on to higher grades, but in most cases he is unable to cope with courses in the upper grades because they demand basic skills which he does not possess. ("Try," a teacher said to us, "to teach history to a child who cannot read.")

Frustrated and disillusioned, the child becomes a discipline problem. Often he leaves school, sometimes before the end of junior high school. (About two-thirds of those who enter the three high schools in the center of the curfew area do not graduate.) He slips into the ranks of the permanent jobless, illiterate and untrained, unemployed and unemployable. All the talk about the millions which the government is



spending to aid him raise his expectations but the benefits seldom reach him.

Reflecting this spiral of failure, unemployment in the disadvantaged areas runs two to three times the county average, and the employment available is too often intermittent. A family whose breadwinner is chronically out of work is almost invariably a disintegrating family. Crime rates soar and welfare rolls increase, even faster than the population.

This spiral of failure has a most damaging side effect. Because of the low standard of achievement in the schools in the urban core and adjacent areas, parents of the better students from advantaged backgrounds remove them from these schools, either by changing the location of the family home or by sending the children to private school. In turn, the average achievement level of the schools in the disadvantaged area sinks lower and lower. The evidence is that this chain reaction is one of the principal factors in maintaining de facto school segregation in the urban core and producing it in the adjacent areas where the Negro population is expanding. From our study, we are persuaded that there is a reasonable possibility that raising the achievement levels of the disadvantaged Negro child will materially lessen the tendency towards de facto segregation in education, and that this might possibly also make a substantial contribution to ending all de facto segregation.

#### All Segments of Society

Perhaps for the first time our report will bring into clear focus, for all the citizens to see, the economic and sociological conditions in our city that underlay the gathering anger which impelled the rioters to escalate the routine arrest of a drunken driver into six days of violence. Yet, however powerful their grievances, the rioters had no legal or moral justification for the wounds they inflicted. Many crimes, a great

many felonies, were committed. Even more dismaying, as we studied the record, was the large number of brutal exhortations to violence which were uttered by some Negroes. Rather than making proposals, they laid down ultimatums with the alternative being violence. All this nullified the admirable efforts of hundreds, if not thousands, both Negro and white, to quiet the situation and restore order.

What can be done to prevent a recurrence of the nightmare of August? It stands to reason that what we and other cities have been doing, costly as it all has been, is not enough. Improving the conditions of Negro life will demand adjustments on a scale unknown to any great society. The programs that we are recommending will be expensive and burdensome. And the burden, along with the expense, will fall on all segments of our society — on the public and private sectors, on industry and labor, on company presidents and hourly employees, and most indispensably, upon the members and leaders of the Negro community. For unless the disadvantaged are resolved to help themselves, whatever else is done by others is bound to fail.

The consequences of inaction, indifference, and inadequacy, we can all be sure now, would be far costlier in the long run than the cost of correction. If the city were to elect to stand aside, the walls of segregation would rise ever higher. The disadvantaged community would become more and more estranged and the risk of violence would rise. The cost of police protection would increase, and yet would never be adequate. Unemployment would climb; welfare costs would mount apace. And the preachers of division and demagoguery would have a matchless opportunity to tear our nation asunder.

#### Of Fundamental and Durable Import

As a Commission, we are seriously concerned that the existing breach, if allowed to persist, could in time split our society irretrievably. So serious and so explosive is the situation that, unless it is checked, the

August riots may seem by comparison to be only a curtain-raiser for what could blow up one day in the future.

Our recommendations will concern many areas where improvement can be made but three we consider to be of highest priority and greatest importance.

1. Because idleness brings a harvest of distressing problems, employment for those in the Negro community who are unemployed and able to work is a first priority. Our metropolitan area employs upwards of three millions of men and women in industry and in the service trades, and we face a shortage of skilled and semi-skilled workers as our economy expands. We recommend that our robust community take immediate steps to relieve the lack of job opportunity for Negroes by cooperative programs for employment and training, participated in by the Negro community, by governmental agencies, by employers and by organized labor.

2. In education, we recommend a new and costly approach to educating the Negro child who has been deprived of the early training that customarily starts at infancy and who because of early deficiencies advances through school on a basis of age rather than scholastic attainment. What is clearly needed and what we recommend is an emergency program designed to raise the level of scholastic attainment of those who would otherwise fall behind. This requires pre-school education, intensive instruction in small classes, remedial courses and other special treatment. The cost will be great but until the level of scholastic achievement of the disadvantaged child is raised, we cannot expect to overcome the existing spiral of failure.

3. We recommend that law enforcement agencies place greater emphasis on their responsibilities for crime prevention as an essential element of the law enforcement task, and that they institute improved means for handling citizen complaints and community relationships.

The road to the improvement of the condition of the disadvantaged Negro which lies through education and employment is hard and long, but there is no shorter route. The avenue of violence and lawlessness leads to a dead end. To travel the long and difficult road will require courageous leadership and determined participation by all parts of our community, but no task in our times is more important. Of what shall it avail our nation if we can place a man on the moon but cannot cure the sickness in our cities?

## 144 HOURS IN AUGUST 1965

### The Frye Arrests

On August 11, 1965, California Highway Patrolman Lee W. Minikus, a Caucasian, was riding his motorcycle along 122nd street, just south of the Los Angeles City boundary, when a passing Negro motorist told him he had just seen a car that was being driven recklessly. Minikus gave chase and pulled the car over at 116th and Avalon, in a predominantly Negro neighborhood, near but not in Watts. It was 7:00 p.m.

The driver was Marquette Frye, a 21-year-old Negro, and his older brother, Ronald, 22, was a passenger. Minikus asked Marquette to get out and take the standard Highway Patrol sobriety test. Frye failed the test, and at 7:05 p.m., Minikus told him he was under arrest. He radioed for his motorcycle partner, for a car to take Marquette to jail, and a tow truck to take the car away.

They were two blocks from the Frye home, in an area of two-story apartment buildings and numerous small family residences. Because it was a very warm evening, many of the residents were outside.

Ronald Frye, having been told he could not take the car when Marquette was taken to jail, went to get their mother so that she could claim the car. They returned to the scene about 7:15 p.m. as the second motorcycle patrolman, the patrol car, and tow truck arrived. The original group of 25 to 50 curious spectators had grown to 250 to 300 persons.

Mrs. Frye approached Marquette and scolded him for drinking. Marquette, who until then had been peaceful and cooperative, pushed her away and moved toward the crowd, cursing and shouting at the officers that they would have to kill him to take him to jail. The patrolmen pursued Marquette and he resisted.

The watching crowd became hostile, and one of the patrolmen radioed for more help. Within minutes, three more highway patrolmen arrived. Minikus and his partner were now struggling with both Frye brothers. Mrs. Frye, now belligerent, jumped on the back of one of the officers and ripped his shirt. In an attempt to subdue Marquette, one officer swung at his shoulder with a night stick, missed, and struck him on the forehead, inflicting a minor cut. By 7:23 p.m., all three of the Fryes were under arrest, and other California Highway Patrolmen and, for the first time, Los Angeles police officers had arrived in response to the call for help.

Officers on the scene said there were now more than 1,000 persons in the crowd. About 7:25 p.m., the patrol car with the prisoners, and the tow truck pulling the Frye car, left the scene. At 7:31 p.m., the Fryes arrived at a nearby sheriff's substation.

Undoubtedly the situation at the scene of the arrest was tense. Belligerence and resistance to arrest called for forceful action by the officers. This brought on hostility from Mrs. Frye and some of the bystanders, which, in turn, caused increased actions by the police. Anger at the scene escalated and, as in all such situations, bitter recriminations from both sides followed.

Considering the undisputed facts, the Commission finds that the arrest of the Fryes was handled efficiently and expeditiously. The sobriety test administered by the California Highway Patrol and its use of a transportation vehicle for the prisoner and a tow truck to remove his car are in accordance with the practices of other law enforcement agencies, including the Los Angeles Police Department.

### The Spitting Incident

As the officers were leaving the scene, someone in the crowd spat on one of them. They stopped withdrawing and two highway patrolmen

went into the crowd and arrested a young Negro woman and a man who was said to have been inciting the crowd to violence when the officers were arresting her. Although the wisdom of stopping the withdrawal to make these arrests has been questioned, the Commission finds no basis for criticizing the judgment of the officers on the scene.

Following these arrests, all officers withdrew at 7:40 p.m. As the last police car left the scene, it was stoned by the now irate mob.

As has happened so frequently in riots in other cities, inflated and distorted rumors concerning the arrests spread quickly to adjacent areas. The young woman arrested for spitting was wearing a barber's smock, and the false rumor spread throughout the area that she was pregnant and had been abused by police. Erroneous reports were also circulated concerning the treatment of the Frieses at the arrest scene.

The crowd did not disperse, but ranged in small groups up and down the street, although never more than a few blocks from the arrest scene. Between 8:15 p.m. and midnight, the mob stoned automobiles, pulled Caucasian motorists out of their cars and beat them, and menaced a police field command post which had been set up in the area. By 1:00 a.m., the outbreak seemed to be under control but, until early morning hours, there were sporadic reports of unruly mobs, vandalism, and rock throwing. Twenty-nine persons were arrested.

#### A Meeting Misfires

On Thursday morning, there was an uneasy calm, but it was obvious that tensions were still high. A strong expectancy of further trouble kept the atmosphere tense in the judgment of both police and Negro leaders. The actions by many individuals, both Negro and white, during Thursday, as well as at other times, to attempt to control the riots are commendable. We have heard many vivid and impressive accounts of the work of Negro leaders, social workers, probation offi-

cers, churchmen, teachers, and businessmen in their attempts to persuade the people to desist from their illegal activities, to stay in their houses and off the street, and to restore order.

However, the meeting called by the Los Angeles County Human Relations Commission, at the request of county officials, for the purpose of lowering the temperature misfired. That meeting was held beginning about 2:00 p.m. in an auditorium at Athens Park, eleven blocks from the scene of the arrest. It brought together every available representative of neighborhood groups and Negro leaders to discuss the problem. Members of the press, television, and radio covered the meeting. Various elected officials participated and members of the Los Angeles Police Department, Sheriff's Office and District Attorney's Office were in attendance as observers.

Several community leaders asked members of the audience to use their influence to persuade area residents to stay home Thursday evening. Even Mrs. Frye spoke and asked the crowd to "help me and others calm this situation down so that we will not have a riot tonight." But one Negro high school youth ran to the microphones and said the rioters would attack adjacent white areas that evening. This inflammatory remark was widely reported on television and radio, and it was seldom balanced by reporting of the many responsible statements made at the meeting. Moreover, it appears that the tone and conduct of the meeting shifted, as the meeting was in progress, from attempted persuasion with regard to the maintenance of law and order to a discussion of the grievances felt by the Negro.

Following the main meeting, certain leaders adjourned to a small meeting where they had discussions with individuals representing youth gangs and decided upon a course of action. They decided to propose that Caucasian officers be withdrawn from the troubled area, and that Negro officers in civilian clothes and unmarked cars be substituted.

Members of this small group then went to see Deputy Chief of Police Roger Murdock at the 77th Street Station, where the proposals were rejected by him at about 7:00 p.m. They envisaged an untested method of handling a serious situation that was rapidly developing. Furthermore, the proposal to use only Negro officers ran counter to the policy of the Police Department, adopted over a period of time at the urging of Negro leaders, to deploy Negro officers throughout the city and not concentrate them in the Negro area. Indeed, when the proposal came the police had no immediate means of determining where the Negro officers on the forces were stationed. At this moment, rioting was breaking out again, and the police felt that their established procedures were the only way to handle what was developing as another night of rioting. Following those procedures, the police decided to set up a perimeter around the center of trouble and keep all crowd activity within that area.

#### An Alert Is Sounded

About 5:00 p.m. Thursday, after receiving a report on the Athens Park meeting, Police Chief William H. Parker called Lt. Gen. Roderic Hill, the Adjutant General of the California National Guard in Sacramento, and told him that the Guard might be needed. This step was taken pursuant to a procedure instituted by Governor Brown and agreed upon in 1963 and 1964 between the Los Angeles Police Department, the Governor and the Guard. It was an alert that the Guard might be needed.

Pursuant to the agreed-upon procedure, General Hill sent Colonel Robert Quick to Los Angeles to work as liaison officer. He also alerted the commanders of the 40th Armored Division located in Southern California to the possibility of being called. In addition, in the absence of Governor Brown who was in Greece, he called the acting

Governor, Lieutenant Governor Glenn Anderson, in Santa Barbara, and informed him of the Los Angeles situation.

The Emergency Control Center at Police Headquarters — a specially outfitted command post — was opened at 7:30 p.m. on Thursday. That day, one hundred and ninety deputy sheriffs were asked for and assigned. Between 6:45 and 7:15 p.m., crowds at the scene of the trouble of the night before had grown to more than 1,000. Firemen who came into the area to fight fires in three overturned automobiles were shot at and bombarded with rocks. The first fire in a commercial establishment was set only one block from the location of the Frye arrests, and police had to hold back rioters as firemen fought the blaze.

Shortly before midnight, rock-throwing and looting crowds for the first time ranged outside the perimeter. Five hundred police officers, deputy sheriffs and highway patrolmen used various techniques, including fender-to-fender sweeps by police cars, in seeking to disperse the mob. By 4:00 a.m. Friday, the police department felt that the situation was at least for the moment under control. At 5:09 a.m., officers were withdrawn from emergency perimeter control.

During the evening on Thursday, Lt. Gov. Anderson had come to his home in suburban Los Angeles from Santa Barbara. While at his residence, he was informed that there were as many as 8,000 rioters in the streets. About 1:00 a.m. Friday, he talked by phone to John Billett of his staff and with General Hill, and both advised him that police officials felt the situation was nearing control. About 6:45 a.m., at Lt. Gov. Anderson's request, Billett called the Emergency Control Center and was told by Sergeant Jack Eberhardt, the intelligence officer on duty, that "the situation was rather well in hand," and this information was promptly passed on to Anderson. Anderson instructed Billett to keep in touch with him and left Los Angeles at 7:25 a.m.

for a morning meeting of the Finance Committee of the Board of Regents of the University of California in Berkeley, and an afternoon meeting of the full Board.

#### Friday, the 13th

Around 8:00 a.m., crowds formed again in the vicinity of the Frye arrests and in the adjacent Watts business area, and looting resumed. Before 9:00 a.m., Colonel Quick called General Hill in Sacramento from the Emergency Control Center and told him riot activity was intensifying.

At approximately 9:15 a.m., Mayor Sam Yorty and Chief Parker talked on the telephone, and they decided, at that time, to call the Guard. Following this conversation, Mayor Yorty went to the airport and boarded a 10:05 flight to keep a speaking engagement at the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco. Mayor Yorty told our Commission that "by about 10:00 or so, I have to decide whether I am going to disappoint that audience in San Francisco and maybe make my city look rather ridiculous if the rioting doesn't start again, and the mayor has disappointed that crowd." The Mayor returned to the City at 3:35 p.m.

The riot situation was canvassed in a Los Angeles Police Department staff meeting held at 9:45 a.m. where Colonel Quick, of the California National Guard, was in attendance, along with police officials. At 10:00 a.m., according to Colonel Quick, Chief Parker said, "It looks like we are going to have to call the troops. We will need a thousand men." Colonel Quick has said that Chief Parker did not specifically ask him to get the National Guard. On the other hand, Chief Parker has stated that he told Colonel Quick that he wanted the National Guard and that Quick indicated that he would handle the request.

In any event, at 10:15 a.m., Colonel Quick informed General Hill by telephone that Chief Parker would probably request 1,000 national

guardsmen. General Hill advised Colonel Quick to have Chief Parker call the Governor's office in Sacramento. At 10:50 a.m., Parker made the formal request for the National Guard to Winslow Christian, Governor Brown's executive secretary, who was then in Sacramento, and Christian accepted the request.

By mid-morning, a crowd of 3,000 had gathered in the commercial section of Watts and there was general looting in that district as well as in adjacent business areas. By the time the formal request for the Guard had been made, ambulance drivers and firemen were refusing to go into the riot area without an armed escort.

#### Calling the Guard

At approximately 11:00 a.m., Christian reached Lt. Gov. Anderson by telephone in Berkeley and relayed Chief Parker's request. Lt. Gov. Anderson did not act on the request at that time. We believe that this request from the chief law enforcement officer of the stricken city for the National Guard should have been honored without delay. If the Lieutenant Governor was in doubt about conditions in Los Angeles, he should, in our view, have confirmed Chief Parker's estimate by telephoning National Guard officers in Los Angeles. Although we are mindful that it was natural and prudent for the Lieutenant Governor to be cautious in acting in the absence of Governor Brown, we feel that, in this instance, he hesitated when he should have acted.

Feeling that he wished to consider the matter further, Lt. Gov. Anderson returned to Los Angeles by way of Sacramento. A propeller-driven National Guard plane picked him up at Oakland at 12:20 p.m., and reached McClellan Air Force Base, near Sacramento, at 1:00 p.m. Anderson met with National Guard officers and civilian staff members and received various suggestions, ranging from advice from Guard officers that he commit the Guard immediately to counsel from some civilian staff members that he examine the situation in Los Angeles and

meet with Chief Parker before acting. Although Anderson still did not reach a decision to commit the Guard, he agreed with Guard officers that the troops should be assembled in the Armories at 5 p.m., which he had been told by General Hill was the earliest hour that it was feasible to do so. Hill then ordered 2,000 men to be at the armories by that hour. Anderson's plane left Sacramento for Los Angeles at 1:35 p.m. and arrived at 3:35 p.m.

At the time Lt. Gov. Anderson and General Hill were talking in Sacramento, approximately 856 Guardsmen in the 3rd Brigade were in the Long Beach area 12 miles to the south, while enroute from San Diego, outfitted with weapons, to summer camp at Camp Roberts. We feel it reasonable to conclude, especially since this unit was subsequently used in the curfew area, that further escalation of the riots might have been averted if these Guardsmen had been diverted promptly and deployed on station throughout the riot area by early or mid-afternoon Friday.

Friday afternoon, Hale Champion, State Director of Finance, who was in the Governor's office in Los Angeles, reached Governor Brown in Athens. He briefed the Governor on the current riot situation, and Brown said he felt the Guard should be called immediately, that the possibility of a curfew should be explored, and that he was heading home as fast as possible.

Early Friday afternoon, rioters jammed the streets, began systematically to burn two blocks of 103rd Street in Watts, and drove off firemen by sniper fire and by throwing missiles. By late afternoon, gang activity began to spread the disturbance as far as fifty and sixty blocks to the north.

Lieutenant Governor Anderson arrived at the Van Nuys Air National Guard Base at 3:35 p.m. After talking with Hale Champion who urged him to call the Guard, Anderson ordered General Hill to

commit the troops. At 4:00 p.m., he announced this decision to the press. At 5:00 p.m., in the Governor's office downtown, he signed the proclamation officially calling the Guard.

By 6:00 p.m., 1,336 National Guard troops were assembled in the armories. These troops were enroute to two staging areas in the rioting area by 7:00 p.m. However, neither the officials of the Los Angeles Police Department nor officers of the Guard deployed any of the troops until shortly after 10:00 p.m. Having in mind these delays, we believe that law enforcement agencies and the National Guard should develop contingency plans so that in future situations of emergency, there will be a better method at hand to assure the early commitment of the National Guard and the rapid deployment of the troops.

The first death occurred between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m. Friday, when a Negro bystander, trapped on the street between police and rioters, was shot and killed during an exchange of gunfire.

### The Worst Night

Friday was the worst night. The riot moved out of the Watts area and burning and looting spread over wide areas of Southeast Los Angeles several miles apart. At 1:00 a.m. Saturday, there were 100 engine companies fighting fires in the area. Snipers shot at firemen as they fought new fires. That night, a fireman was crushed and killed on the fire line by a falling wall, and a deputy sheriff was killed when another sheriff's shotgun was discharged in a struggle with rioters.

Friday night, the law enforcement officials tried a different tactic. Police officers made sweeps on foot, moving en masse along streets to control activity and enable firemen to fight fires. By midnight, Friday, another 1,000 National Guard troops were marching shoulder to shoulder clearing the streets. By 3:00 a.m. Saturday, 3,356 guardsmen

were on the streets, and the number continued to increase until the full commitment of 13,900 guardsmen was reached by midnight on Saturday. The maximum commitment of the Los Angeles Police Department during the riot period was 934 officers; the maximum for the Sheriff's Office was 719 officers.

Despite the new tactics and added personnel, the area was not under control at any time on Friday night, as major calls of looting, burning, and shooting were reported every two to three minutes. On throughout the morning hours of Saturday and during the long day, the crowds of looters and patterns of burning spread out and increased still further until it became necessary to impose a curfew on the 46.5 square-mile area on Saturday. Lieutenant Governor Anderson appeared on television early Saturday evening to explain the curfew, which made it a crime for any unauthorized persons to be on the streets in the curfew area after 8:00 p.m.

#### The Beginning of Control

Much of the Saturday burning had been along Central Avenue. Again using sweep tactics, the guardsmen and police were able to clear this area by 3:30 p.m. Guardsmen rode "shotgun" on the fire engines and effectively stopped the sniping and rock throwing at firemen. Saturday evening, road blocks were set up in anticipation of the curfew. The massive show of force was having some effect although there was still riot activity and rumors spread regarding proposed activity in the south central area.

When the curfew started at 8:00 p.m., police and guardsmen were able to deal with the riot area as a whole. Compared with the holocaust of Friday evening, the streets were relatively quiet. The only major exception was the burning of a block of stores on Broadway between 46th and 48th Streets. Snipers again prevented firemen from entering

the area, and while the buildings burned, a gun battle ensued between law enforcement officers, the Guard, and the snipers.

During the day Sunday, the curfew area was relatively quiet. Because many markets had been destroyed, food distribution was started by churches, community groups, and government agencies. Governor Brown, who had returned Saturday night, personally toured the area, talking to residents. Major fires were under control but there were new fires and some rekindling of old ones. By Tuesday, Governor Brown was able to lift the curfew and by the following Sunday, only 252 guardsmen remained.

Coordination between the several law enforcement agencies during the period of the riot was commendable. When the California Highway Patrol called for help on Wednesday evening, the Los Angeles Police Department responded immediately. When the situation grew critical Thursday evening, the Los Angeles Sheriff's Office committed substantial forces without hesitation. Indeed, the members of all law enforcement agencies — policemen, sheriff's officers, Highway Patrolmen, city Marshalls — and the Fire Departments as well — worked long hours, in harmony and with conspicuous bravery, to quell the disorder. However, the depth and the seriousness of the situation were not accurately appraised in the early stages, and the law enforcement forces committed and engaged in the several efforts to bring the riots under control on Thursday night and all day Friday proved to be inadequate. It required massive force to subdue the riot, as demonstrated by the effectiveness of the Guard when it moved into position late Friday night and worked in coordination with the local law enforcement units.

#### Other Areas Affected

As the word of the South Los Angeles violence was flashed almost continuously by all news media, the unrest spread. Although outbreaks in other areas were minor by comparison with those in South Central



Los Angeles, each one held dangerous potential. San Diego, 102 miles away, had three days of rioting and 81 people were arrested. On Friday night, there was rioting in Pasadena, 12 miles from the curfew zone. There, liquor and gun stores were looted and Molotov cocktails and fire bombs were thrown at police cars. Only prompt and skillful handling by the police prevented this situation from getting out of control.

Pacoima, 20 miles north, had scattered rioting, looting, and burning. There was burning in Monrovia, 25 miles east. On Sunday night, after the curfew area was quiet, there was an incident in Long Beach, 12 miles south. About 200 guardsmen and Los Angeles police assisted Long Beach police in containing a dangerous situation which exploded when a policeman was shot when another officer's gun discharged as he was being attacked by rioters. Several fires were set Sunday night in the San Pedro-Wilmington area, 12 miles south.

#### Was There a Pre-established Plan?

After a thorough examination, the Commission has concluded that there is no reliable evidence of outside leadership or pre-established plans for the rioting. The testimony of law enforcement agencies and their respective intelligence officers supports this conclusion. The Attorney General, the District Attorney, and the Los Angeles police have all reached the conclusion that there is no evidence of a pre-plan or a pre-established central direction of the rioting activities. This finding was submitted to the Grand Jury by the District Attorney.

This is not to say that there was *no* agitation or promotion of the rioting by local groups or gangs which exist in pockets throughout the south central area. The sudden appearance of Molotov cocktails in quantity and the unexplained movement of men in cars through the areas of great destruction support the conclusion that there was organization and planning after the riots commenced. In addition, on that

tense Thursday, inflammatory handbills suddenly appeared in Watts. But this cannot be identified as a master plan by one group; rather it appears to have been the work of several gangs, with membership of young men ranging in age from 14 to 35 years. All of these activities intensified the rioting and caused it to spread with increased violence from one district to another in the curfew area.

#### The Grim Statistics

The final statistics are staggering. There were 34 persons killed and 1,032 reported injuries, including 90 Los Angeles police officers, 136 firemen, 10 national guardsmen, 23 persons from other governmental agencies, and 773 civilians. 118 of the injuries resulted from gunshot wounds. Of the 34 killed, one was a fireman, one was a deputy sheriff, and one a Long Beach policeman.

In the weeks following the riots, Coroner's Inquests were held regarding thirty-two of the deaths.\* The Coroner's jury ruled that twenty-six of the deaths were justifiable homicide, five were homicidal, and one was accidental. Of those ruled justifiable homicide, the jury found that death was caused in sixteen instances by officers of the Los Angeles Police Department and in seven instances by the National Guard.\*\*

It has been estimated that the loss of property attributable to the riots was over \$40 million. More than 600 buildings were damaged by burning and looting. Of this number, more than 200 were totally destroyed by fire. The rioters concentrated primarily on food markets,

\* The Coroner's Inquest into one of the deaths was cancelled at the request of the deceased's family. There was no inquest into the death of the deputy sheriff because of pending criminal proceedings.

\*\*A legal memorandum analyzing the procedures followed in the inquests, which was prepared at the request of the Commission, has been forwarded to the appropriate public officials for their consideration.

liquor stores, furniture stores, clothing stores, department stores, and pawn shops. Arson arrests numbered 27 and 10 arson complaints were filed, a relatively small number considering that fire department officials say that all of the fires were incendiary in origin. Between 2,000 and 3,000 fire alarms were recorded during the riot, 1,000 of these between 7:00 a.m. on Friday and 7:00 a.m. on Saturday. We note with interest that no residences were deliberately burned, that damage to schools, libraries, churches and public buildings was minimal, and that certain types of business establishments, notably service stations and automobile dealers, were for the most part unharmed.

There were 3,438 adults arrested, 71% for burglary and theft. The number of juveniles arrested was 514, 81% for burglary and theft. Of the adults arrested, 1,232 had never been arrested before; 1,164 had a "minor" criminal record (arrest only or convictions with sentence of 90 days or less); 1,042 with "major" criminal record (convictions with sentence of more than 90 days). Of the juveniles arrested, 257 had never been arrested before; 212 had a "minor" criminal record; 43 had a "major" criminal record. Of the adults arrested, 2,057 were born in 16 southern states whereas the comparable figure for juveniles was 131. Some of the juveniles arrested extensively damaged the top two floors of an auxiliary jail which had been opened on the Saturday of the riots.

Those involved in the administration of justice — judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, and others—merit commendation for the steps they took to cope with the extraordinary responsibility thrust on the judicial system by the riots. By reorganizing calendars and making special assignments, the Los Angeles Superior and Municipal Courts have been able to meet the statutory deadlines for processing the cases of those arrested. Court statistics indicate that by November 26, the following dispositions had been made of the 2278 felony cases filed against adults: 856 were found guilty; 155 were acquitted; 641 were

disposed of prior to trial, primarily by dismissal; 626 are awaiting trial. Of the 1133 misdemeanor cases filed, 733 were found guilty, 81 were acquitted, 184 dismissed and 135 are awaiting trial.

The police and Sheriff's Department have long known that many members of gangs, as well as others, in the south central area possessed weapons and knew how to use them. However, the extent to which pawn shops, each one of which possessed an inventory of weapons, were the immediate target of looters, leads to the conclusion that a substantial number of the weapons used were stolen from these shops. During the riots, law enforcement officers recovered 851 weapons. There is no evidence that the rioters made any attempt to steal narcotics from pharmacies in the riot area even though some pharmacies were looted and burned.

Overwhelming as are the grim statistics, the impact of the August rioting on the Los Angeles community has been even greater. The first weeks after the disorders brought a flood tide of charges and recriminations. Although this has now ebbed, the feeling of fear and tension persists, largely unabated, throughout the community. A certain slowness in the rebuilding of the fired structures has symbolized the difficulty in mending relationships in our community which were so severely fractured by the August nightmare.

The Governor charged the Commission to "probe deeply the immediate and underlying causes of the riots." Therefore, the search for causes, both immediate and long-term, has been our primary objective over the past 100 days. We have all recognized our obligation to find, if we can, the seed bed of violence. This search has taken us to the disciplines of psychology, sociology, economics, and political science, as well as to the curfew area itself. We have crossed and re-crossed various fields of knowledge relevant to our endeavor. In doing so, we have drawn on the expertise and experience of people at many levels of government, in California's leading universities, in business and labor organizations here and elsewhere, as well as of private individuals with long experience in the central Los Angeles area.

It would have simplified our task and assisted enormously in the formulation of our conclusions and recommendations if we could have identified a single cause for the disorder. This was not to be. It is our firm conclusion that no single circumstance can be identified as the sole reason for the August riots; the causes and contributing circumstances were many. It is these circumstances that the balance of the report probes. We start with law enforcement.

## LAW ENFORCEMENT — THE THIN THREAD

"As the patriots of seventy-six did to the support of the Declaration of Independence, so to the support of the Constitution and laws let every American pledge his life, his property, and his sacred honor — let every man remember that to violate the law is to trample on the blood of his father and to tear the charter of his own children's liberty. Let reverence for the laws . . . become the political religion of the nation; and let the old and the young, the rich and the poor, the grave and the gay of all sexes and tongues and colors and conditions, sacrifice unceasingly upon its altars."

Abraham Lincoln, January 27, 1837

Maintenance of law and order is a prerequisite to the enjoyment of freedom in our society. Law enforcement is a critical responsibility of government, and effective enforcement requires mutual respect and understanding between a law enforcement agency and the residents of the community which it serves.

### The Problem — Deep and Serious

The conduct of law enforcement agencies, most particularly the Los Angeles Police Department, has been subject to severe criticism by many Negroes who have appeared before the Commission as witnesses. The bitter criticism we have heard evidences a deep and longstanding schism between a substantial portion of the Negro community and the Police Department. "Police brutality" has been the recurring charge. One witness after another has recounted instances in which, in their opinion, the police have used excessive force or have been disrespectful and abusive in their language or manner.\*

\* The more than seventy cases of alleged police brutality which were submitted to the Commission contributed to our understanding of the depths of the feelings of a segment of the Negro community toward the Police Department. Because our responsibility has been to review the general policy and procedure for handling citizen complaints rather than to review individual cases, we have referred all of the cases to the appropriate and responsible agencies.

On the other hand, the police have explained to us the extent to which the conduct of some Negroes when apprehended has required the use of force in making arrests. Example after example has been recited of arrestees, both men and women, becoming violent, struggling to resist arrest, and thus requiring removal by physical force. Other actions, each provocative to the police and each requiring more than normal action by the police in order to make an arrest or to perform other duties, have been described to us.

Chief of Police Parker appears to be the focal point of the criticism within the Negro community. He is a man distrusted by most Negroes and they carefully analyze for possible anti-Negro meaning almost every action he takes and every statement he makes. Many Negroes feel that he carries a deep hatred of the Negro community. However, Chief Parker's statements to us and collateral evidence such as his record of fairness to Negro officers are inconsistent with his having such an attitude. Despite the depth of the feeling against Chief Parker expressed to us by so many witnesses, he is recognized, even by many of his most vocal critics, as a capable Chief who directs an efficient police force that serves well this entire community.

With respect to the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, the situation is somewhat different. Generally speaking, the Negro community does not harbor the same angry feeling toward the Sheriff or his staff as it does toward the Los Angeles police. Nevertheless, witnesses recited to us instances of alleged brutality and excessive use of force by deputy sheriffs on duty.

The reasons for the feeling that law enforcement officers are the enemy of the Negro are manifold and it is well to reflect on them before they are accepted. An examination of seven riots in northern cities of the United States in 1964 reveals that each one was started over a police incident, just as the Los Angeles riot started with the

arrest of Marquette Frye. In each of the 1964 riots, "police brutality" was an issue, as it was here, and, indeed, as it has been in riots and insurrections elsewhere in the world. The fact that this charge is repeatedly made must not go unnoticed, for there is a real danger that persistent criticism will reduce and perhaps destroy the effectiveness of law enforcement.

Our society is held together by respect for law. A group of officers who represent a tiny fraction of one percent of the population is the thin thread that enforces observance of law by those few who would do otherwise. If police authority is destroyed, if their effectiveness is impaired, and if their determination to use the authority vested in them to preserve a law abiding community is frustrated, all of society will suffer because groups would feel free to disobey the law and inevitably their number would increase. Chaos might easily result. So, while we must examine carefully the claim of police brutality and must see that justice is done to all groups within our society, we must, at the same time, be sure that law enforcement agencies, upon which so much depends, are not rendered impotent.

#### Solution is Possible — But Action by Both Police and the Negro Community is Essential

Much can be done to correct the existing impressions and to promote an understanding between the police and the Negro community, and this, we believe, is essential in the interest of crime prevention. The steps that have been taken appear to us to be insufficient. Further action is indicated.

Basically, on the one hand, we call for a better understanding by the law enforcement agencies of Negro community attitudes and, on the other hand, a more widespread understanding within the Negro community of the value of the police and the extent to which the law enforcement agencies provide it with security. Although the criminal

element among the Negroes is only a small fraction of the Negro population, over half of all crimes of violence committed in the City of Los Angeles are committed by Negroes, and the great majority of the victims of these crimes are Negroes. Thus, the police, in their effort to suppress crime, are doing so to protect the entire community, including the Negro community.

#### The Board of Police Commissioners — Strengthening is Needed

The Board of Police Commissioners, as the civilian head of the Police Department, has a great responsibility. It is charged with establishing policies for the Department, supervising and managing the Department, and seeing to it that its policies are followed. In discharging its duties, the Board should have a major role in the improvement and maintenance of police-community relationships. In addition, the Board has extensive responsibilities for the issuance and revocation of permits for carrying on a large number of businesses.

The Commission believes that this Board, meeting one afternoon a week, with compensation of the members of the Board at \$10.00 per meeting, cannot and does not exercise the control and direction of the Police Department which is prescribed by the City Charter. It is significant to us that the Board and its actions have not been drawn into the recent criticisms of police conduct in the predominantly Negro areas of the city. Almost without exception, the complaints that we have heard have been directed against Chief Parker and the police officers. No one, not a single witness, has criticized the Board for the conduct of the police, although the Board is the final authority in such matters. We interpret this as evidence that the Board of Police Commissioners is not visibly exercising the authority over the Department vested in it by the City Charter. Our own investigation and evaluation, and the testimony of witnesses, confirm this.

Therefore, we urge that steps be taken immediately to arm the Board of Police Commissioners with all necessary tools to discharge its City Charter responsibilities. This will mean increased compensation for the Commissioners, more frequent meetings of the Board, a larger staff, and a revision of procedures that have been followed in the past. A Board, shouldering the responsibilities envisaged here, must be composed of capable and dedicated men, chosen by the Mayor and confirmed by the City Council, willing to devote the necessary time and thoughtful effort to the task.

#### Complaint Procedures — A New Approach to an Old Problem

A strained relationship such as we have observed as existing between the police and the Negro community can be relieved only if the citizen knows that he will be fairly and properly treated, that his complaints of police misconduct will be heard and investigated, and that, if justified, disciplinary action will be taken against the offending officer.

Under the present Police Department procedure, citizen complaints are received by the Police Department or by the Board of Police Commissioners. All investigations of citizen complaints, wherever received, are conducted under the overall supervision of the Internal Affairs Division of the Police Department. In the vast majority of cases, primary responsibility for investigating allegations of officer misconduct has in the past been placed with the division commander of the individual officer involved. After the investigation has been completed, the determination whether a complaint should be sustained is made either by the Chief of Police or by the Board of Police Commissioners, depending upon where the complaint was originally filed. Where a complaint is sustained, responsibility for discipline is vested in the Chief of Police and the Board of Rights, which provides a departmental hearing to an accused officer before serious sanctions can be imposed.

The Commission has concluded that there are several deficiencies in this existing procedure. We believe that division commanders and those in the command structure should not conduct investigations of complaints with respect to their own subordinate officers. Moreover, existing procedures are not sufficiently visible to or understood by the public. Finally, we do not think there should be a difference, as there now is, in the handling of a complaint depending solely upon whether it was filed with the Board or the Police Department.

Under the existing procedure, the impression is widespread that complaints by civilians go unnoticed, that police officers are free to conduct themselves as they will, and that the manner in which they handle the public is of little concern to the higher authorities. This impression is not consistent with fact. Departmental policies set high standards of conduct for police officers in their contacts with citizens, and these standards are conscientiously enforced. In 1964, 412 complaints of police misconduct were received from citizens. Forty-two complaints alleging police misconduct in contacts with citizens were sustained.\* Despite these facts, the impression that citizen complaints are ignored continues because of deficiencies in the existing procedure. Thus, the clamor is raised from many sources for an independent civilian review board.

The Commission feels that a civilian review board, authorized to investigate, and perhaps to decide, complaints, but with no other law enforcement responsibilities, would endanger the effectiveness of law enforcement, which would be intolerable at a time when crime is on the increase throughout the country. Experience in two cities which have such boards — and in which alleged misconduct of police officers

\* Of the 42 complaints which were sustained, 10 were for alleged excessive force, 23 were for alleged discourtesy or profanity, and nine alleged unlawful arrest or unreasonable search. In 1964, 470 officers, approximately 10% of the police force, were assessed disciplinary penalties of some type.

was a major issue in connection with riots which occurred in those cities in 1964 — has not demonstrated the advantages of such a review board. From our observations and from testimony of knowledgeable law enforcement administrators, we are persuaded that the value of an independent board would not outweigh the likely deleterious effects on law enforcement. We, therefore, propose improvements in the existing procedure which will go far toward establishing the widest possible confidence in the handling of all complaints but which will not destroy the authority vested by the City Charter in the Board of Police Commissioners and the Chief of Police.

To insure independent investigation of complaints, we recommend that an "Inspector General" should be established in the Police Department, under the authority of the Chief of Police but outside the chain of command. Properly staffed with sworn officers and civilian personnel, the Inspector General would perform the functions of the present Internal Affairs Division and would be responsible for making investigations and recommendations on all citizen complaints, whether filed with the Board or the Department. An adequate hearing process for the complainant should be made available at some point in the procedure, and he should be informed of the action taken on his complaint. The "Inspector General" concept has proved, through years of experience, to be effective in the four military services, each of which has such an independent and objective agency under the Chief of Staff of the service. The Inspector General's investigations can be visible to the public. He would report to the Chief of Police, and his findings and recommendations on all complaints would be the basis for the Chief's report to the Board on all such complaints. The Board would act on all complaints as it now acts on some complaints initially presented to it; that is, it would pass on whether the complaint is or is not sustained. Under the procedure suggested here, responsibility for

discipline would remain with the Chief of Police and the Board of Rights as provided by the City Charter.

These improvements, we believe, would provide a satisfactory procedure for processing citizen complaints both from the viewpoint of the Los Angeles Police Department and the community. We have focused our discussion on the existing procedure in the Police Department. We encourage the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department to adopt those aspects of our conclusions which may be applicable to its procedures for handling citizen complaints.

#### **Community-Police Relations —**

##### **A Responsibility for Crime Prevention**

In 1963, the Los Angeles Police Department issued an excellent statement of the need for and purpose of a community relations program. The order stated:

"The mutual advantages of a friendly relationship between the people of a community and their police force should be widely understood and more fully appreciated. The success of a police force in the performance of its duties is largely measured by the degree of support and cooperation it receives from the people it serves. It is of paramount importance, therefore, to secure for this department the confidence, respect, and approbation of the public. The cultivation of such desirable attitudes on the part of the public is dependent upon reciprocal attitudes on the part of this department."

Witness after witness, in discussing the question of police-community relations, emphasized the importance of "non-punitive contacts" as basic to the problem. But, from the statements of many witnesses it appears that the steps taken by the Los Angeles Police Department, although commendable, have been faltering. The worthwhile Deputy Auxiliary Police program, which was designed to bring youth into closer contact with police organizations, has been permitted to lapse and pass out of existence. The staff assigned to community relations

activities is not large enough, and the range of community relations activities has been limited.

Moreover, little has been done in recent years to encourage the Negro youth's support of the police, or to implant in the youth's mind the true value of the Police Department with respect to the welfare of the youth. Productive programs can and must be developed in Los Angeles, as they have been developed elsewhere.

We commend the Board of Police Commissioners and the Chief of Police for the community relations activities which the Department has undertaken in 1965. These have included the appointment of a Coordinator of Community Relations Activity and a Community-Police Relations Advisory Committee, and an increase in the staff of the community relations unit. Visitation programs to elementary schools and command level seminars on community relations have also been useful steps. But, we believe, a greater effort is indicated.

We propose more intensive in-service human relations training programs for officer personnel; youth programs such as the Deputy Auxiliary Police program; periodic open forums and workshops in which the police and residents of the minority communities will engage in discussions of law enforcement; and frequent contact between the police and the students in junior and senior high schools.

Such programs are a basic responsibility of the Police Department. They serve to prevent crime, and, in the opinion of this Commission, crime prevention is a responsibility of the Police Department, equal in importance to law enforcement.

Programs of this nature, and the underlying philosophies that support them, can only be initiated through determined leadership at the top. If these actions are pursued energetically, we can expect a gratifying improvement in the relationship between the police and the

community. Successful implementation of these programs will require additional personnel and funds and we believe that the City Council should authorize both without delay.

Again, while we have focused our discussion on the Police Department, we encourage the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department to introduce community relations activities of the character we have recommended for the Police Department.

#### More Negroes and Mexican-Americans Must Enter Careers in Law Enforcement

Finally, the Commission expresses its concern over the relatively few sworn officer personnel in the Police Department and the Sheriff's Department who are Negroes or Mexican-Americans. Only four percent of the sworn personnel of the Police Department and six percent of the Sheriff's Department are Negroes and an even smaller percentage are Mexican-American. Both of these departments recruit their personnel through the civil service agencies and selections are made on a basis of qualifications without regard for race, religion, or national origin. Despite efforts by the civil service agencies, the law enforcement departments, and some elected officials to encourage Negroes and Mexican-Americans to enter the law enforcement field, the results have been unsatisfactory.

We believe it essential that the number of sworn officers of each minority group should be increased substantially. To bring this about, more active recruitment by the Police and Sheriff's Departments and the civil service must be undertaken. Furthermore, educational and private institutions and organizations, and political leaders as well, should encourage members of the minority groups to enter careers in law enforcement. Finally, budget support for extensive efforts in recruitment, which should perhaps include pre-employment prepara-

tory training, should be provided by both the City Council and the Board of Supervisors.

To implement our conclusions, we offer the following recommendations:

- 1) **The Board of Police Commissioners should be strengthened.**
- 2) **Investigations of all citizen complaints should be conducted by an independent Inspector General under the authority of the Chief of Police in the implementation of procedures established by the Board of Police Commissioners.**
- 3) **The Police Department should institute expanded community relations programs.**
- 4) **The Sheriff's Department should effectuate these recommendations to the extent that they are applicable to it.**



## EMPLOYMENT — KEY TO INDEPENDENCE

### Unemployment — The Immediate Problem

The most serious immediate problem that faces the Negro in our community is employment — securing and holding a job that provides him an opportunity for livelihood, a chance to earn the means to support himself and his family, a dignity, and a reason to feel that he is a member of our community in a true and a very real sense. Unemployment and the consequent idleness are at the root of many of the problems we discuss in this report. Many witnesses have described to us, dramatically and we believe honestly, the overwhelming hopelessness that comes when a man's efforts to find a job come to naught. Inevitably, there is despair and a deep resentment of a society which he feels has turned its back upon him. Welfare does not change this. It provides the necessities of life, but adds nothing to a man's stature, nor relieves the frustrations that grow. In short, the price for public assistance is loss of human dignity.

The welfare program that provides for his children is administered so that it injures his position as the head of his household, because aid is supplied with less restraint to a family headed by a woman, married or unmarried. Thus, the unemployed male often finds it to his family's advantage to drift away and leave the family to fend for itself. Once he goes, the family unit is broken and is seldom restored. Changes in welfare administration designed to hold together rather than break apart the family have not been wholly successful.

From unemployment, other problems develop. In a discouraged frame of mind, the unemployed is driven toward anti-social behavior. Even if he remains at home, he neither serves as a worthy example to his children nor does he actively motivate them to go to school and study. Thus, a chain reaction takes place. The despair and disillusionment of the unemployed parent is passed down to the chil-

dren. The example of failure is vividly present and the parent's frustrations and habits become the children's. ("Go to school for what?" one youngster said to us.)

There is no immediate total solution to this problem, but it is our opinion that far more can be done than is now being done by government, by the private business sector, by organized labor, and by the Negro community, individually and jointly, to find jobs in the short range and in the long range to train Negroes so that a high proportion of them will not remain out of work.

**Government job efforts.** Government authorities have recognized the problem and have moved to solve it. City, county, state and federal governments have helped to siphon off some of the distress by hiring high proportions of Negroes. For example, 25% of all new Los Angeles county employees in 1964 were Negro.

Other government programs have been initiated and more have been proposed. These are designed to provide immediate full time and part time employment of the qualified plus training for the unqualified. As examples, under the War on Poverty Program, the Job Corps has provided a full-time work-training program for 363 youths. The Neighborhood Youth Corps has provided part time work for over 1500 youths from the south central area. Also, the Neighborhood Adult Participation Project has constructively employed over 400 in Los Angeles and this number is scheduled to double in the near future.

More recently, and perhaps belatedly, the State Department of Employment, using funds provided by the U. S. Department of Labor, has opened Youth Opportunity Centers to counsel youths in disadvantaged areas and assist them in finding employment. Also, the State Employment Service has recently opened an office in Watts to provide more convenient job placement service to nearby residents.

A disproportionate number of Negroes are presently being rejected for military service because of their inability to meet the relatively high standards insisted upon by the armed services. This raises the question of a reappraisal of recruitment and selective service standards to determine whether they are unnecessarily restrictive. Can they be revised to enable the military service to make a larger contribution to relieving the plight of the Negro without jeopardizing its standards of efficiency?

The Government employment programs are commendable and each in its way has helped to alleviate the problem but they are far from adequate. The critical problem persists.

Advanced billing with respect to federal programs has created a false impression that more job opportunities would be available than actually have developed. The endless bickering between city, state and federal government officials over the administration of the authorized programs — most particularly the Poverty Program — has disappointed many. Yet serious as has been this controversy, we doubt the delay caused by the argument has been of major consequence, except for its psychological effects. The wheels of bureaucracy grind slowly, the claimants on the limited available dollar are countless, and since no priority system exists, long periods of time are necessarily consumed in evaluating programs at the local, state and Washington level before funds are provided. One advocate of a training program told us that when he presented his program to the local anti-poverty office, he found that his project was number 158 in line and consideration could not be expected for about seven months. All of this is understandable; projects are numerous and hope for support is great, but nevertheless, reasonable supervision of the federal purse requires time.

The magnitude of the unemployment problem among Negroes in Los Angeles is difficult to assess, but a reasonable approximation is

possible. The total number of unemployed in the county is about 160,000. It is clear that unemployment in the Negro community is two to three times that in the white community; from all indications, there are some 25,000 unemployed Negroes in the central section of Los Angeles County and probably an equal number of unemployed Mexican-Americans.

After studying current governmental employment programs, as well as a number of those proposed for the future, we conclude that the serious unemployment problem of the disadvantaged groups will not soon, or perhaps ever, be alleviated by all of them put together. Other more imaginative and more dynamic plans must be developed and must go forward. This means all private employers must make a more constructive effort to give the qualified Negro an equal opportunity for a job he is able to fill, and they and organized labor must make a massive effort to raise the qualifications of the unqualified through sizable training programs.

**A California proposal.** Failure of these programs to provide enough jobs led Governor Brown to order a survey of the state to determine how many useful jobs could be created. His survey found many in such fields as law enforcement, education, public health, and conservation. Thus, he advocated a national program estimated to cost the federal government 2.5 billion dollars annually (\$250,000,000 for California) which would provide some 50,000 jobs within our state and a proportionate number of jobs elsewhere throughout the nation. An equal amount of money would be needed each year the program continues. Obviously such a program is bound to encounter tough sledding in Washington, especially as the Vietnam costs escalate, and one can readily imagine that months, if not a year or two, might pass before approval would be given and money made available, if it ever is. Since we are somewhat skeptical about the feasibility of this program (especially as to the capacity of the unemployed in the disad-

vantaged areas to fulfill the jobs specified), we feel that it should be tested on a pilot basis before any massive program is launched. In any event, because there will inevitably be a delay in commencing such a program, we are persuaded that other steps must be taken now.

**Training programs.** Existing training programs are many. They are authorized and funded by both the federal and state governments and are administered by several separate agencies — the Department of Labor, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and the Office of Economic Opportunity. The main source of financing for vocational training is the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962 (MDTA), which has provided funds for vocational training, both institutional and on the job. Programs under this act have established high entrance requirements and are primarily conducted in the classroom. Thus, training under the act skims the cream of the unemployed, and unfortunately it seldom includes the most disadvantaged. Programs funded wholly or in part by MDTA include: The Youth Training and Employment Projects, supervised by the Economic and Youth Opportunities Agency (a product of the War on Poverty); institutional vocational training administered by the State Department of Employment; On-the-Job Training administered by the Division of Apprenticeship Standards; and numerous other public and private programs to which grants have been made. A distinct type of training is the apprenticeship training which is offered throughout the State of California under the jurisdiction of the Division of Apprenticeship Standards. In addition, state and federal legislation has empowered the Department of Social Welfare and the Bureau of Public Assistance to conduct vocational training for potential employables on the relief rolls.

All of these programs are worthwhile and, if properly administered, contribute constructively to a partial solution to the unemployment

problem. But the very diversity of approaches reflected in this listing of programs points up the importance of coordination. Although many different types of unemployed are being reached, the several programs are not visible, and all of the needy are not as well informed as they should be concerning their purpose and existence. This fault, we believe, could be remedied by establishment of permanent and convenient local centers where many of the programs will be located and the unemployed can go for desired and necessary training. We find that, largely because of dispersal, the programs now in existence are not being used to do the most good for the most distressed.

In most programs, two essential elements seem to be missing. The first is "attitudinal training" to help the candidate develop the necessary motivation, certain basic principles of conduct, and essential communication skills, all of which are necessary for success in the training course and for the employment to follow. The second is counseling, a service necessary if use is to be made of the particular skills, interest and attitudes of the candidate. These deficiencies appear to occur principally for budgetary reasons.

Finally, there is an apparent lack of coordination between many of the training programs and the job opportunities. All too often a youth in the south central area goes through training, acquires the necessary skill to fill a job only to find that no job awaits him. The results are disastrous. ("Train for what?" he says to his friends.)

A contributing factor to this situation is the attitude of some labor unions. Some of them contend training programs should not be initiated or conducted in areas where apprenticeship programs exist or where, in their view, there is an adequate supply of union members. This we believe is an unnecessary and self-serving restriction which, in time, will harm the national interest. The unavailability of skilled and semi-skilled workers, already in short supply, might readily retard

the expansion of our economy. The President's Manpower Report both for 1964 and 1965 demonstrates an urgent need for skilled and semi-skilled workers for the rest of this decade. This need should generate additional training programs in occupational areas where restrictions now bar the way.

**Private efforts.** We commend the work of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce through its Rehabilitation Committee, under the chairmanship of Mr. H. C. McClellan. This committee organized 100 employers and, through their efforts, over 1,200 Negroes have been employed by private industry in recent months. It is the hope of our Commission that all of the 1,000 or more major employers in the metropolitan area will join this cooperative effort. We urge that a permanent organization, properly staffed and financed by the Chamber of Commerce, be established for this purpose. The committee, as well as several major employers, should continue to operate, in conjunction with the State Employment Service in the south central area and the committee of Negro businessmen, and should establish joint counseling and employment functions, so that those who seek jobs can make application with a minimum of inconvenience and expense.

**A proposal for additional action.** The great majority of the unemployed in the south central Los Angeles area are unemployable because they lack skill and training. To meet that pressing need, a major job training and placement program should be initiated in the area. This program should be large and should be concentrated in an area which is predominantly Negro.

To be successful, this program must be organized by the Negroes themselves. It must be their program. An organization created by Negro leadership can best encourage the unemployed, most particularly the young men and women who may lack both education and

motivation, to come forward and train for the opportunities that will be opened up to them. The initiation of the program by the Negroes themselves should insure that it is well received.

Private employers and unions should support such a move by supplying the necessary equipment, counseling service and in some instances, instructors. Courses should be directed toward job availability and the employers should take upon their shoulders the responsibility of providing jobs to the graduates. Funds will be needed for physical facilities and for operations, and these can be provided under existing legislation such as the Economic Opportunity Act and Manpower Development and Training Act. A good example of such a program is the Opportunities Industrialization Center (OIC), which has been in successful operation in Philadelphia for some time.

Compensation should not be necessary for those trainees who are receiving welfare support. If, on the other hand, the trainee receives no welfare and has no means for his livelihood, then a minimum compensation would be essential during the training program.

Through such a program, we believe that this community, which employs three million men and women, can make a real dent in the unemployment problem. Furthermore, we feel that industry, which faces a problem of scarcity of skilled and semi-skilled workers in certain areas, would be inestimably benefited by such a program. We do not dismiss the importance of the current programs which we have discussed — those providing immediate employment or those providing training for future employment. What is suggested here is vitally necessary and will both complement and enlarge upon existing programs.

The short range program for hiring the qualified unemployed, and the longer range program for training others for later employment, is dependent for its success on the motivation of the Negro

and the ability of the Negro to compete with all other applicants for the available jobs. The cooperation we urge between industry, labor unions and members of the Negro community, necessary for the accomplishment of these programs, will be futile unless the individual, when trained, can stand up in our competitive society.

### An End to Discrimination

It is the Commission's opinion that both willful and unwitting discrimination in employment have existed and continue to exist within our community. There is an opinion among many employers that the lack of skill and motivation on the part of many Negroes makes them undependable employees, and thus preference is given to those of other ethnic backgrounds. In addition, in many labor unions, past practices, which are extremely difficult to modify or reverse, result in discrimination against the Negroes, especially in the building trade unions and in many apprenticeship programs. Fortunately, in many instances the attitudes on the part of both the employer and labor union leaders have changed in recent years and months, and this has appreciably reduced discrimination against the minorities. Nevertheless, a greater and more conscientious effort on the part of business and labor is essential if the problem of discrimination is to be solved.

To that end, we advocate legislation to empower the California Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC) to initiate a program under which all employers of more than 250 workers will be required to file reports, at least annually, listing their total employment and the percentage of Negroes, Mexican-Americans, and other identifiable minority groups by occupational category. Likewise, all labor unions should file reports giving comparable information with respect to their total membership within the state. Such a procedure will afford an accurate insight into the progress which is being made by employers and labor unions in the elimination of discrimination.

No law forbids the employer or labor union from maintaining records of the ethnic background of their work force or membership. Some employers have complained that they do not keep such records because they fear the information will, in some way, be used against them. The FEPC must make a special effort to dispel the fear held by some employers that it would attempt to force the employment of specified percentages of minority workers irrespective of qualifications. Since the employer lives in a competitive environment, the FEPC and its administrators must hold to the principle of equality in opportunity based upon the ability of the individual rather than merely on numbers of minority workers employed.

In making this recommendation, we believe that if the maximum degree of cooperation from employers and labor unions is to be achieved, FEPC and other agencies dealing with discriminatory employment practices must continue to rely heavily on persuasion and education in the affirmative action programs. These are the techniques that have been most successful in the past.

**Arrest records.** Evidence gathered by the Commission's staff indicates that a job applicant with an arrest record faces an additional burden in finding employment. While security considerations sometimes preclude hiring an applicant with an arrest record, blanket rejection of such persons without regard for the nature of the arrest or whether there has been a conviction should be discouraged. We urge employers to re-assess job qualifications with a view to considering whether it is feasible to increase employment opportunities for persons with arrest records.

In light of the foregoing considerations, we recommend:

1. **There should immediately be developed in the affected area a job training and placement center through the combined efforts of Negroes, employers, labor unions, and government.**

2. Federal and state governments should seek to insure, through the development of new facilities and additional means of communication, that maximum advantage is taken of government and private training programs and employment opportunities in our disadvantaged communities.
3. Legislation should be enacted requiring employers with more than 250 employees and all labor unions to report annually to the State Fair Employment Practices Commission the racial composition of their work force and membership.

## EDUCATION — OUR FUNDAMENTAL RESOURCE

Education is the keystone of democracy. It provides communication between the diverse elements of our complex society and aids in the elimination of barriers of race and religion. It holds the greatest promise for breaking the cycle of failure which is at the core of the problems of the disadvantaged area. Hope centers on education.

Having recognized this early in our investigation, we launched an in-depth study to determine the quality of education offered in the public schools in the riot area and in other areas of the city. A comparison was made between schools in the riot area (and other disadvantaged areas of the city) and schools in other sections of the city (citywide, and in an advantaged area). Five study areas were selected within the Los Angeles City Unified School District. Four of these are disadvantaged areas: Watts and Avalon (predominantly Negro and within the riot area), and Boyle Heights and East Los Angeles (predominantly Mexican-American and outside the riot area). The other study area included Pacific Palisades, Westwood, and Brentwood, which are, by comparison, advantaged areas.\* Citywide data were also compiled.

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\* Watts, Avalon, Boyle Heights, and East Los Angeles are four of 136 geographical study areas in Los Angeles County designated by the Welfare Planning Council, Los Angeles Region, and rank least favorably in the county with respect to the following criteria: family income, male unemployment, education, family status, housing, the ratio of youth and aged to productive adults, and the status of youth in terms of neglect and delinquency. Pacific Palisades, Westwood, and Brentwood are areas in Los Angeles that have the most favorable rankings, relative to the remainder of the county, with respect to the above-mentioned criteria. These data, based on the 1960 census and other sources, are contained in the Welfare Planning Council's publication *Social Profiles: Los Angeles County*, Research Report No. 21 (July 1, 1965).

**Achievement in the Disadvantaged Areas**

Are the students in the disadvantaged areas able to read and write? Achievement test scores of students in the study areas provide a distressing answer. Average achievement test scores for students in disadvantaged areas were shockingly lower than citywide and advantaged area averages in *all* subjects and at *all* grade levels. Table 1 shows that the average student in disadvantaged areas ranks in the lowest 18th to 24th percentile of the national fifth-grade test population in reading vocabulary and reading comprehension; that is, roughly 80% of the national fifth-grade population achieves better in reading than he does.

Table 1  
AVERAGE READING PERFORMANCE IN  
COMPARISON AREAS - GRADE B5

Area	Reading Vocabulary Ranking	Reading Comprehension Ranking
Citywide.....	48	48
Advantaged Area.....	81	75
Disadvantaged Area — Watts.....	20	24
Disadvantaged Area — Avalon.....	20	21
Disadvantaged Area — Boyle Heights.....	18	19
Disadvantaged Area — East Los Angeles.....	18	24

On the basis of these scores, it appears that the average student in the fifth grade in schools in the disadvantaged areas is unable to read and understand his textbook materials, to read and understand a daily newspaper, or to make use of reading and writing for ordinary purposes in his daily life. This degree of illiteracy seriously impairs his ability to profit from further schooling.

We examined the scores made on achievement tests given to students in the eighth grade. Their melancholy message, as shown in

Table 2, is that the relative achievement of eighth grade students in the disadvantaged areas is even lower than in the fifth grade.

Table 2  
AVERAGE READING PERFORMANCE IN  
COMPARISON AREAS - GRADE B8

Area	Reading Vocabulary Ranking	Reading Comprehension Ranking
Citywide.....	49	47
Advantaged Area.....	79	77
Disadvantaged Area — Watts.....	13	16
Disadvantaged Area — Avalon.....	14	15
Disadvantaged Area — Boyle Heights.....	15	20
Disadvantaged Area — East Los Angeles.....	16	17

Table 2 shows that early reading retardation apparently results in students falling further behind as they continue in school.

Table 3 indicates that in the eleventh grade, average reading achievement continues to be significantly below the citywide average.

Table 3  
AVERAGE READING PERFORMANCE IN  
COMPARISON AREAS - GRADE B11

Area	Reading Vocabulary Ranking	Reading Comprehension Ranking
Citywide.....	63	55
Advantaged Area.....	82	73
Disadvantaged Area — Watts.....	27	24
Disadvantaged Area — Avalon.....	32	29
Disadvantaged Area — Boyle Heights.....	34	29
Disadvantaged Area — East Los Angeles.....	33	30

This is so even though many of the low achievers in the disadvantaged areas have already dropped out of school by the eleventh grade, and their absence from the statistics tends to bring up the average scores. Currently, in the Los Angeles City School District, about 30% of children entering the ninth grade drop out before completing high school. Dropout rates (percentage of average yearly attendance) show that three of the high schools that serve students who reside in disadvantaged areas of south central Los Angeles have the highest percentage of dropouts of the 45 senior high schools. In these three schools in predominantly Negro areas, about two-thirds of the students who enter drop out before graduating from high school.

Since the average achievement of students in the disadvantaged areas is lower than citywide achievement, it was not surprising that we found that their intelligence test scores were also lower. To a great extent, school intelligence tests measure the same abilities as achievement tests. Contrary to what many people believe, intelligence tests do not measure only inborn mental ability; they measure *present* ability at the time of the test, which is heavily affected by acquired verbal ability and by cultural-environmental experiences. Students with high inherent potential may do poorly on intelligence tests if they lack the background that the tests require.\*

Essentially, the reading and writing level of students in the disadvantaged areas is far too low for them either to advance in school or to function effectively in society. The frequent direct consequences of illiteracy are delinquency, welfare problems, unemployment, poverty, and political and social isolation. What are the causes of this inability to read? Are the schools discriminating against children in

\* To whatever extent these intelligence tests do measure potential for learning, the average scores of students in the disadvantaged areas are not so low as to indicate that these students cannot learn to read and write, if given the proper educational experience.

disadvantaged areas? How do educational services in disadvantaged areas compare with the services in schools in other areas? Are there environmental factors outside the schools that are related to low achievement? These are the fundamental questions, and the Commission investigated each.

#### Educational Services in Disadvantaged Areas

The Commission's study compared the quality of educational services offered by the schools in the advantaged and disadvantaged areas. Comparisons were made of class size, teacher qualifications, physical facilities, counseling and special services, curricula, and instructional materials. The Commission then considered whether the quality of these school services could account for differences in achievement of students in schools in advantaged and disadvantaged areas.

**Class size.** Comparisons of pupil-teacher ratios in advantaged and disadvantaged areas indicate that the average class size tends to be about the same or slightly smaller for schools in disadvantaged areas.

**Teacher qualifications.** Teachers in the advantaged areas have an average of almost three years more teaching experience in the Los Angeles City Schools than teachers in the disadvantaged areas (7 as compared with almost 10 years). This is reflected by the lower proportion of teachers with permanent status (tenure) in schools in the disadvantaged areas. Two factors appear to account for these differences: first, more experienced teachers tend to move to schools in more advantaged areas; and second, disadvantaged areas tend to be high enrollment growth areas with more new non-permanent teachers assigned to the added classrooms. However, in both the advantaged and disadvantaged areas, teachers have about the same years (4-5 years) of experience in the school where they are now teaching.



**Double sessions.** Overcrowding is a significant problem in some elementary schools in the Los Angeles City Schools. In these schools the same classroom must be used for two consecutive shifts of students. Although double sessions exist in all subdivisions of the entire school system, the disadvantaged areas have more double sessions than any other part of the city. During the current school year, more than three-quarters of the 26,200 students on double sessions attend schools where the enrollment is predominantly Negro or Mexican-American. For example, of the 58 schools in the West District (one of the subdivisions of the Los Angeles Unified School District), 12 have double-session classes; the enrollment in all 12 of these schools is predominantly Negro. The problem of overcrowding has been caused primarily by two factors: high enrollment growth and renovation of classrooms in older buildings in the disadvantaged areas. In our view, the incidence of double sessions is not the product of invidious discrimination.

Currently, in the Los Angeles City Schools, there are 328 unused classrooms in regular elementary schools. We urge the School Board to consider whether there are not practical ways to lessen double sessions by arranging for children whose school is overcrowded to attend nearby schools with unused classrooms.

**School buildings.** Are the school buildings better in the disadvantaged areas? The ratio of permanent to temporary buildings shows a slight advantage for the schools in disadvantaged areas. However, the inescapable fact is that many school buildings in disadvantaged areas are older, since they are in older sections of the city. Many of these older buildings require renovation to meet safety standards. On the other hand, new schools have been built, new facilities have been added to older schools, and school buildings have been modernized in the curfew area, as funds were available. Moreover, main-

tenance, refurbishing, repainting, equipping, and custodial care schedules appear to be uniform throughout the district.

**Cafeterias.** Of the 429 Los Angeles regular elementary schools, 114 are not currently operating cafeterias. Almost two-thirds (71) of these schools are located in the East, North, and South Districts, which include most of the schools in the city with predominantly Negro or Mexican-American enrollment. A major reason for the lack of school cafeterias is the policy adopted by the Los Angeles City Schools which requires school cafeterias to be self-supporting and to serve a minimum number of meals. In addition, no bond funds have been allocated for construction of cafeterias since 1958. Even in those schools where there are cafeterias, the Los Angeles City Schools do not provide free or reduced-price lunches to needy students. An adequate mid-day meal is essential to a meaningful educational experience. Action should be taken to provide cafeteria facilities and free or reduced-price meals for needy students in disadvantaged areas.

**Libraries.** Some schools in the disadvantaged study areas do not have libraries while all schools in the advantaged study areas have libraries. In part, lack of libraries is due to the utilization of rooms to meet rapid enrollment growth and to house special classes. Libraries should be provided in all schools.

**Counseling and special services.** At both the elementary and secondary levels there are fewer students per counselor in the disadvantaged areas than in the advantaged areas, and there are also more special services (such as remedial reading, compensatory education, and social adjustment) offered in the disadvantaged areas. Nevertheless, the counseling and special services for students in the disadvantaged area are inadequate to meet the need and should be augmented.

**Curricula.** Because of the higher achievement level of their students, schools in advantaged areas offer a wider variety of advanced

courses. There are more honors courses, advanced placement courses, and programs at nearby colleges and universities for the academically talented and gifted students in advantaged areas than in disadvantaged areas. The Commission believes that adequate special provisions should be made for all academically talented and gifted students to attend advanced courses. Where necessary, transportation should be provided so that these students may participate in advanced programs offered in other high schools or in universities.

**Instructional materials.** Instructional materials, including text books and audio-visual aids, are provided on an approximately equal basis. Where there are differences, they favor the disadvantaged areas. The total expenditure for instructional materials is higher per student in the disadvantaged areas than it is in the advantaged areas.

In summary, it appears that inequalities exist with respect to incidence of double sessions, cafeterias, libraries, and course offerings for academically talented students. These differences can and should be eliminated. However, the Commission does not feel that these inequalities or the differences in teacher experience or status fully explain the lower achievement of students in disadvantaged areas.

### Environmental Factors

There is increasing evidence to indicate that children who live in disadvantaged areas begin school with a deficiency in environmental experiences which are essential for learning. Several factors outside the school itself appear to relate to low achievement in school, such as the level of education of adults in disadvantaged area communities, mobility, and disciplinary and law enforcement problems.

The educational level of any community and of parents substantially influences the achievement of children in school. There is a serious educational deficit in the adult population in disadvantaged

areas. According to the 1960 census, about two-thirds of the adults in the disadvantaged areas had failed to graduate from high school. In addition, a high percentage (almost 14%) of the adults living in the four study areas were classified as functional illiterates (defined as completing less than five years of school). Adding to the problem of education has been the tremendous immigration of Negroes from the South where educational opportunities are limited.

Rapidly increasing school enrollment and high population mobility also characterize the disadvantaged areas. The lack of stability in these communities is reflected in extremely high student transiency, that can impair both the learning ability of students and the effectiveness of teachers. In addition, many schools in the disadvantaged areas are faced with serious disciplinary problems and with disturbing conditions in the neighborhood that can also affect the educational achievement of students. These conditions include loiterers and distracting and unsavory elements near school sites. The personal security of both teachers and students is often threatened. We believe that adequate school personnel should be provided to deal with disciplinary problems in schools and adequate law enforcement personnel should be provided at or near schools where necessary.

Children in disadvantaged areas are often deprived in their pre-school years of the necessary foundations for learning. They have not had the full range of experiences so necessary to the development of language in the pre-school years, and hence they are poorly prepared to learn when they enter school. Their behavior, their vocabulary, their verbal abilities, their experience with ideas, their view of adults, of society, of books, of learning, of schools, and of teachers are such as to have a negative impact on their school experience. Thus, the disadvantaged child enters school with a serious educational handicap, and because he gets a poor start in school, he drops further behind as he continues through the grades. His course toward aca-

demie failure is already set before he enters school; it is rooted in his earliest childhood experiences. The Commission concludes that this is the basic reason for low achievement in the disadvantaged areas.

The schools in the disadvantaged areas do not provide a program that meets the unique educational needs of culturally disadvantaged children. Although special remedial programs are offered in an attempt to compensate for deficiencies in learning, the *basic* organization and orientation of schools is the same in advantaged and disadvantaged areas. The same educational program for children of unequal background does not provide an equal opportunity for children to learn.

### Overcoming Low Achievement

We propose that the programs for the schools in disadvantaged areas be vastly reorganized and strengthened so as to strike at the heart of low achievement and break the cycle of failure. We advocate a new, massive, expensive, and frankly experimental onslaught on the problem of illiteracy. We propose that it be attacked at the time and place where there is an exciting prospect of success.

The program for education which we recommend is designed to raise the scholastic achievement of the average Negro child up to or perhaps above the present average achievement level in the City. We have no hard evidence to prove conclusively that the program advocated in this report will accomplish this purpose. We emphasize that the proposed program is designed to raise the level of educational achievement of many who are far below average and the success of such an effort must be proven and this proof can come only from the results of the program itself. Nevertheless, we believe the objectives so essential to our society that funds, teachers, specialists and supervision should be provided as proposed.

First, school services in disadvantaged areas must be extended down to the ages of three and four, in order to give these children the background and reinforcements, particularly in language skills, that they have not received in their "informal" education prior to school. These programs for disadvantaged three and four-year-old children must be provided throughout the regular school year and they must be permanently maintained. Classes must be more than child-care or baby-sitting services; they must be carefully programmed to provide the background these children need to develop verbal and language abilities.

Second, class size must be significantly reduced for children now in elementary and junior high schools in disadvantaged areas. In order to maximize opportunity for effective teaching, class size in these schools should be reduced to a maximum of 22; a less drastic reduction from the present average class of 33 would still be expensive but would offer much less promise of success. These programs would have to be continued for a minimum of three years in the junior high schools and six years in the elementary schools.

Third, additional personnel to cope with disturbed and retarded children, and special problems of the disadvantaged child should be made available in these schools. The energies and services of the teacher can be dissipated if she has to work with a myriad of special problems that are much greater in number and extent than they are in the more advantaged areas. To be effective, the teacher in disadvantaged areas needs much more immediately available help with guidance, welfare, health, and social and emotional problems than do teachers in advantaged areas. While all of these services are presently available, the need for such services is far greater in these disadvantaged areas.

A sharp reduction in class size, together with provision for special supporting services and materials, would offer teachers a more pro-

## THE CONSUMER AND THE COMMUTER

### The Disadvantaged Consumer

The Commission heard recurrent testimony of alleged consumer exploitation in south central Los Angeles: of higher prices being charged for food there than in other parts of town, of spoiled meat or produce or old bread being sold at the same price as fresh, of high interest rates on furniture and clothing purchases, of shoddy materials at high prices. Complaints were also registered to the effect that there is a bias against the curfew area in the practices of insurance companies and institutional lenders. In a related vein, a number of witnesses advanced the view that there was a vengeance pattern to the destruction of stores in the curfew area, that it was a retribution on merchants who were guilty of consumer exploitation, and particularly on Caucasians who were said to "take from the area but put nothing back into it."

Our study of the patterns of burning and looting does not indicate any significant correlation between alleged consumer exploitation and the destruction. On the contrary, a number of stores with a reputation for ethical practices and efficient and low-priced operation suffered major damage ("... the beautiful blocklong market . . . which was 99% Negro staffed, was the second to burn . . ." said one witness), while businesses which were widely unpopular came through the riot unmarked. (Another witness stated, "I hate to say this, but . . . the one they didn't burn—I don't know why they didn't burn that if they were going to burn something—we don't buy anything out of there.") There was some evidence that businesses which were apparently Negro-owned were spared—many by hastily-posted signs such as "Negro-owned", and "Blood brother"—but there is also evidence of the destruction of some Negro-owned businesses.

The consumer problem for many curfew area residents has the double bite of poverty and race. The practices that such residents

criticize are a classic pattern in impoverished communities. But the factor of race—the merchants are for the most part white—sometimes leads the curfew area resident to conclude that oppressive or seemingly oppressive practices are directed against him to keep him in his place. Thus, regardless of actual exploitation, the area resident may believe he is exploited. However, our conclusion, based upon an analysis of the testimony before us and on the reports of our consultants, is that the consumer problems in the curfew area are not due to systematic racial discrimination but rather result from the traditional interplay of economic forces in the market place, aggravated by poverty conditions.

We have no doubt, however, that there are serious problems for the consumer in this disadvantaged area, just as there are wherever there is poverty. One is the costly and inadequate transportation from within the south central area to other parts of Los Angeles which tends to restrict residents of that area to the nearby stores, and which we discuss in more detail later in this section. Another problem is "easy credit" which can become harsh indeed if the disadvantaged person defaults on his installment obligations. The debtor may experience the loss of his property through repossession, or the loss of his job through repeated garnishments of his wages. While it is easy to say that the improvident debtor brought this state upon himself, we deplore the tactics of some merchants and lenders who help induce low-income persons to become heavily debt-burdened. Still another problem for the Negro consumer is the lack of an adequate remedy when he feels he has been unfairly treated. Public and private agencies exist to help the consumer in such a situation, but while manned by able and conscientious professionals, these agencies are generally understaffed, underfinanced, and overburdened. Often the consumer does not even know of the agency's existence.

Having considered the consumer problem, we suggest that useful steps might be taken in the following areas:

1. The Civil Division of the Public Defender's Office might consider expanding its services in the curfew area by opening branch offices and publicizing their availability. The Neighborhood Legal Services Offices, soon to be opened under the anti-poverty program, will provide an additional needed resource. These agencies should consider instituting preventive legal programs to inform the consumer concerning his legal rights.
2. The Better Business Bureau, a private agency which receives complaints regarding consumer practices and is active in consumer education, should open a branch office in south central Los Angeles and equip it with a competent staff. More immediately, courses in consumer education should be expanded in the adult education schools of the Los Angeles City School System and by the many volunteer and private groups working in the curfew area. Further, we encourage law enforcement departments, such as the Consumer Fraud Division of the Attorney General's Office, to investigate vigorously, and prosecutors to prosecute firmly, those who criminally victimize citizens in this area.
3. Based upon our informal survey of conditions of sanitation in food markets in the curfew area, we recommend that the County Health Department increase and improve its inspection program for the markets in all disadvantaged areas of the city.
4. We are persuaded that the businessmen in the curfew area should show a greater interest in the community where they work, or, if already taking an interest, should make more energetic efforts to acquaint the community with what they are doing. We feel it is imperative that positive initiatives be taken immediately by the entire business community. In particular, we believe that lending institutions should

treat Negro borrowers and Negro clients on the basis of each individual's responsibility rather than establish policies for all members of a race or geographical area irrespective of individual differences.

### Transportation

Our investigation has brought into clear focus the fact that the inadequate and costly public transportation currently existing throughout the Los Angeles area seriously restricts the residents of the disadvantaged areas such as south central Los Angeles. This lack of adequate transportation handicaps them in seeking and holding jobs, attending schools, shopping, and in fulfilling other needs. It has had a major influence in creating a sense of isolation, with its resultant frustrations, among the residents of south central Los Angeles, particularly the Watts area. Moreover, the lack of adequate east-west or north-south service through Los Angeles hampers not only the residents of the area under consideration here but also of all the city.

Historically, the Los Angeles area was served by private transportation systems, many of which were sold to the Metropolitan Transit Authority, a public entity, in 1958. The Southern California Rapid Transit District (SCRTD), which was created by the legislature, succeeded the Metropolitan Transit Authority in November 1964. The SCRTD, although a public agency, is neither tax supported nor subsidized. It operates 1500 buses in a four county area and depends for revenue solely upon the fare box. Revenue and expense projections indicate the SCRTD will break even or possibly suffer a loss this year and a loss is forecast in future years. Traditionally, bus systems in the Los Angeles area have met increasing costs in operations by increasing fares and cutting back service. The consequence of these actions has been a transportation system which is prohibitively expensive and inadequate in service.

In general, the coverage and frequency of bus service in the Watts area is comparable to service throughout the Los Angeles area. In the judgment of the Commission, however, it is both inadequate and too costly. As related to the Watts area, the problem stems from the following facts:

(1) Four separate bus entities and one subsidiary operate within the Watts area (Southern California Rapid Transit District, Atkinson Transportation Company and its associated company, South Los Angeles Transportation Company, Torrance Municipal, and Gardena Municipal). These three public entities and one private entity with its subsidiary are by law given exclusive rights to serve within their respective franchised area. A resident of Watts may have to ride on several separate bus systems to reach certain destinations in the immediate area. These transportation systems are uncoordinated, do not provide for free transfers between systems (except in the instance of parent and subsidiary), and have been forced to cut back service and increase fares over the years because of increased capital and operating expenses.

(2) SCRTD is authorized by law to provide long-line services connecting contiguous urban areas, and thus it provides the principal transportation in and out of the Watts area. This system does not have free transfer privileges between most separate urban areas, nor to local services within most contiguous urban areas, many of which maintain their own bus services. This means that transportation from one section of the metropolitan area such as Watts to almost any other area requires an additional fare or fares and transfers.

We believe that adequate and economical public bus transportation is essential to our community and that it should not be ignored because of the debate over mass rapid transit. Indeed, we make a sharp

distinction between mass rapid transit, which is an important issue facing the people of Los Angeles, and public bus transportation, which is essential without regard to what decision is reached on mass rapid transit. Public transportation is particularly essential to the poor and disadvantaged who are unable to own and operate private automobiles. (Only 14% of the families in Watts are car owners as against at least 50% elsewhere within the Los Angeles County.)

Los Angeles is the only major metropolitan area in the United States that does not subsidize the operating losses of its public transportation in one way or another. By comparison, San Francisco supports public transportation within its city limit by public subsidy which we are told amounts to about \$10,000,000 per year. If the Los Angeles area as a whole and the Watts area in particular are to have better bus transportation service, it can only be provided through a public subsidy to accomplish three purposes: reduce fares, purchase or condemn the multiple uncoordinated bus system, and provide system-wide transfers. We believe that such a subsidy is justified because of public necessity and convenience, and therefore we have no hesitation in recommending it.

Therefore, recognizing that transportation improvement for the Watts area cannot be achieved without similar transportation improvement for the Los Angeles metropolitan area, the Commission recommends:

- (1) A public subsidy in one form or another to give SCRTD financial ability to provide an adequate and reasonable bus transportation system throughout the metropolitan area.
- (2) The acquisition by SCRTD of the existing small transportation companies which now complicate and increase the cost of transportation in the Los Angeles area.
- (3) The establishment of transfer privileges in order to minimize transportation costs.

(4) With respect to the Watts area in particular, immediate establishment of an adequate east-west cross town service as well as increasing the north-south service to permit efficient transportation to and from the area.

## WELFARE AND HEALTH

### Public Welfare

The public welfare program in Los Angeles County involves an annual expenditure of over \$400 million. Administered by the County Bureau of Public Assistance, the program is funded by contributions from the federal government (42%), the state government (39%), and the county (19%). The magnitude of this program can be somewhat better grasped by comparing it with the expenditures under the federal War on Poverty which will amount to roughly \$30 million in the Los Angeles area in 1965. In August 1965, approximately 344,000 persons or 5% of the county's population received some form of welfare aid. In the same month 94,000 persons or 14% of the total population of the curfew area as a whole received public assistance. In the Watts area, approximately 24% of the population received such assistance.

Six major welfare programs exist in Los Angeles, five financed by the federal, state and county governments (Old Age Security, Aid to the Disabled, Aid to the Blind, Medical Assistance to the Aged, and Aid to Families with Dependent Children), and one financed by the county alone — General Relief. The costliest of these programs are Old Age Security (\$125 million per year in 1965) and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (about \$95 million per year in 1965).

The predominant welfare program in the curfew area is the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC). Slightly more than two-thirds of all welfare recipients in the curfew area as a whole, and over 83% of all welfare recipients in the Watts area, received assistance under the AFDC program. Broadly speaking, this program provides for payments to a family with a related child under 18 who has been deprived of support by reason of the absence, incapacity, or unemployment of a father. There are two aspects of the AFDC program — (1) the AFDC-FG (Family Group) program where the

family unit is generally headed by a woman and (2) the AFDC-U (Unemployed head) program, authorized by the 1963 legislature to provide for families where there is an unemployed man at the head of the household. Average monthly payments on the AFDC-FG program are \$177 per family; on the AFDC-U program, \$238 per family.

A recent survey indicates that 90% of the AFDC families in the curfew area are Negro. In nine out of 10 of these homes, the father is absent. Over 70% of the parents involved were born in the South or Southwest. Seven out of 10 families on AFDC receive aid for one or more illegitimate children.

In Los Angeles County as a whole, expenditures for the AFDC program have been increasing dramatically, far outrunning the population trends. Between 1960 and 1964, when county population increased 13%, expenditures for the AFDC program rose by 73%. Between 1963 and 1964, when county population increased 2.5%, AFDC expenditures increased over 14% from \$69.4 million to \$79.5 million annually. Expenditures for the new AFDC-U program, which amounted to \$10.2 million in 1964, are not included in the foregoing computation and, therefore, do not explain the rapid increases.

We have no intention of opposing the humanitarian purposes of the welfare program. Nevertheless, we are profoundly disturbed by the accelerating trend of expenditure. Our concern is heightened by the fact that this is occurring, not at a time of economic downturn or depression, but during the present period of unparalleled prosperity for our nation and state. A portion of the rapid increase may be explained by the fact that the Negro and Mexican-American population in Los Angeles is estimated to have increased approximately 40% in the last five years, compared with the general population increase of 13 percent in the same period. Moreover, the high unemployment in this area, referred to early in this report, no doubt has contributed

to the increase. However, the increase in AFDC expenditures, coupled with the increase in population, raises a question in the minds of some whether the generosity of the California welfare program compared with those in the southern and southwestern states is not one of the factors causing the heavy immigration of disadvantaged people to Los Angeles.\*

We are making recommendations in other fields which can assist in lightening the welfare load. The program we are recommending in the field of education will, we believe, have a major impact on unemployment over the long term. We hope our recommendations in the field of employment will have a similar effect in the shorter run. In an important sense, the cost of these programs is justified by their potential for reducing welfare expenses.

However, to be successful in doing so, these programs must be accompanied with a recognition that a truly successful welfare program must, wherever feasible, create an initiative and an incentive on the part of the recipients to become independent of state assistance. Otherwise, the welfare program promotes an attitude of hopelessness and permanent dependence.

After hearing extensive testimony and studying the reports of our consultants, we are convinced that welfare administrators must make a new and vigorous effort to create an initiative and an incentive for independence among welfare recipients. There are some encouraging signs that the philosophy of rehabilitation is being accepted. ("We have about 6,000 people, including the general relief program and the AFDC-U, in some kind of training program," said one administrator.) But we are satisfied that the effort must be doubled and redoubled if any real impact is to be made on the rapidly rising rolls.

\* A comment regarding this sentence by the Rev. James Edward Jones is set forth at page 87 infra.



We are assured that many of the present recipients would rather have work than welfare, but the simple arithmetic of the matter makes us uncertain. A job at the minimum wage pays about \$220 per month, against which there would be transportation, clothes and other expenses. When the average AFDC family receives from \$177 to \$238 per month (depending on the program), the financial incentive to find work may be either negative or non-existent. (Indeed, we were told that the 18 year old girl who is no longer eligible for assistance when living with her mother may have considerable incentive to become a mother herself so as to be eligible again as the head of a new family group.)

The evidence before us makes it plain that welfare administrators are frequently at odds with other governmental officials and one another. Serious conflicts and paradoxes in statutes, regulations, and interpretations were called to our attention. We have not been able, in the time available, to formulate recommendations regarding these disputes or to attempt to clarify the rules, but we are concerned that energy is being diverted to those non-productive areas. We were also told much about the inaccessibility of welfare offices and the poor physical facilities of some. We have been told by some witnesses and by our consultants that these conditions have produced severe irritations and frustrations among many individuals in south central Los Angeles. Studies on these complicated matters have been made in the past and others are being initiated presently by the state government, which perhaps may help resolve these problems.

For the improvement of the welfare picture, to us the most promising prospect is a closer coordination between welfare and related agencies which may provide avenues to independence. We believe that there has not been adequate liaison between welfare workers and government officials involved in employment. (Most welfare recipients are

employable, we are told by a welfare administrator, but from an employment official we hear the exact opposite.)

Similarly, welfare agencies should be cognizant of the many available training programs. From our study of the matter, we believe that there is much room for improvement here. We also believe that the use of child care centers to free heads of families for employment or training should be emphasized. ("Down in that area we have about 2,000 mothers who would like to go into our Community Work and Training Programs, but they can't because there is no place to keep their kids," an administrator told us.) In sum, we implore welfare administrators to devote the most serious and pragmatic efforts to create, wherever feasible, additional incentives for welfare recipients to become independent of public aid.

### Health Problems

Statistics indicate that health conditions of the residents of south central Los Angeles are relatively poor and facilities to provide medical care are insufficient. Infant mortality, for example, is about one and one-half times greater than the city-wide average. Life expectancies are considerably shorter. A far lower percentage of the children are immunized against diphtheria, whooping cough, tetanus, smallpox, and poliomyelitis than in the rest of the county.

As established by the comprehensive reports of consultants to the Commission, the number of doctors in the southeastern part of Los Angeles is grossly inadequate as compared with other parts of the city. It is reported that there are 106 physicians for some 252,000 people, whereas the county ratio is three times higher. The hospitals readily accessible to the citizens in southeastern Los Angeles are also grossly inadequate in quality and in numbers of beds. Of the eight proprietary hospitals, which have a total capacity of 454 beds, only two meet minimum standards of professional quality. The two large public

hospitals, County General and Harbor General, are both distant and difficult to reach. The Commission recognizes that the motivation of patients to take advantage of the available medical facilities is an important factor in health conditions but it appears that the facilities in the area are not even sufficient to care for those who now seek medical attention.

In light of the information presented to it, the Commission believes that immediate and favorable consideration should be given to a new, comprehensively-equipped hospital in this area, which is now under study by various public agencies. To that end we strongly urge that a broadly based committee (including citizens of the area and representatives of the Los Angeles County Department of Charities, Los Angeles County Medical Association, the California Medical Association, the State Department of Health, and medical and public health schools) be appointed to study where such a hospital should be located and to make recommendations upon various technical and administrative matters in connection with the hospital.

We also believe that the Los Angeles County Health Department should increase the number and services of public health and preventive medical facilities in the area and that similar program improvement should be undertaken by the Los Angeles County Department of Mental Health, the Visiting Nurse Association of Los Angeles, and other voluntary health agencies.

## NEITHER SLUMS NOR URBAN GEMS

### How it began

World War II marked the commencement of an explosive growth in Los Angeles' Negro population. In 1940 approximately 75,000 Negroes lived in the county; by the end of World War II, this figure had doubled, as Negroes streamed in to man the assembly lines of Los Angeles' shipyards and aircraft plants. In the post-war years, the growth continued; presently, the county's Negro population stands at about 650,000, an almost tenfold increase since 1940.

Of the entire Negro population in Los Angeles, 88.6 percent resides in areas considered segregated, concentrated for the most part in the 46.5 square miles of south central Los Angeles placed under curfew last August. The reasons for the concentration in south central Los Angeles are both legal and historical; they are closely tied to the origins of the small portion of the curfew area called Watts.

Once part of an old Mexican land grant named El Rancho Tajuata, the predecessor of the community of Watts was the small settlement of Tajuata. This settlement, which was founded in 1883 when the completion of the Santa Fe and Southern Pacific Railroads launched a wave of land speculation in Los Angeles, lay on the right-of-way of the old Los Angeles and San Pedro Railroad.

In the early 1900's, Henry E. Huntington began to construct the Pacific Electric Railroad, providing transportation throughout the Los Angeles basin. Two of the Pacific Electric's major lines — a north-south line running from the center of Los Angeles to Long Beach and an east-west line from Santa Ana to Venice — intersected close to Tajuata on land which had come into the possession of the Watts family. A railroad station was constructed at the intersection and named Watts; shortly thereafter, Tajuata's name was changed to Watts.

With the building of the railroad came the immigration of Mexican laborers, most of whom were employed by Pacific Electric. Since transportation was close at hand and land was cheap, many of the Mexicans settled in Watts, which had been incorporated as an independent city in 1907. About the same time, and probably for the same reasons, a small settlement of Negroes grew up in a portion of Watts called Mudtown.

### The population surges and spreads

The First World War brought new immigrants into Los Angeles to fill the jobs opened by new industries. Some of these immigrants were Negroes from southern states, and they too settled in Watts. The Negro population in this area continued to grow during the 1920's and the 1930's, but until World War II the area was about evenly divided among Negroes, Mexican-Americans, and other Caucasians. The community remained poor; its incorporation into the City of Los Angeles in 1926 resulted in little change in its economy.

As Los Angeles' Negro population began to spiral upwards in World War II, the new arrivals understandably gravitated to the areas already occupied by Negroes — Central Avenue and Watts. Accentuating the concentration here was the fact that deed restrictions and other forms of discriminatory practices made it extremely difficult, often impossible, for Negroes to purchase or rent homes in many sections of the city and county.

As a result, Watts soon filled up and Negro neighborhoods began to expand in adjacent areas to the north, south and west. As they did, Los Angeles saw Caucasians following the same pattern which other cities had witnessed: They moved out when the Negro population in any particular neighborhood increased to appreciable proportions. Thus over the course of a quarter century did the large majority of the

Negro population in Los Angeles, as elsewhere, come to reside in segregated areas.

In recent years, a small number of local citizen groups west of the Harbor Freeway, notably Crenshaw Neighbors, Inc., have attempted to slow or arrest the exodus of Caucasians from neighborhoods which Negroes are entering. Entirely voluntary, their efforts are founded on increasing mutual communication, understanding, and respect between the races. We commend these groups; they act on the admirable principle that an individual should be judged without reference to race. Nonetheless, they face obvious problems, notably the concern of Caucasian parents that the neighborhood's schools will suffer. We believe that the educational program which we urge elsewhere in this report can, in the long run, materially assist such efforts.

In the early 1950's, construction began on the Harbor Freeway, extending from downtown Los Angeles south to the harbor communities. This freeway intersected the westernmost extremities of the areas into which Negroes were then expanding. Since housing and other conditions were superior west of the freeway, crossing the freeway to live on the west side became an ambition of many Negroes. Most of the Negro leaders who appeared before this Commission reside west of the freeway.

### South Central Los Angeles: Living Conditions

What, then, are the living conditions of those who reside in the portion of south central Los Angeles which became part of the curfew area in August of this year? Compared with the conditions under which Negroes live in most other large cities of the United States, Los Angeles conditions are superior. This has been confirmed by witnesses before this Commission who noted, for example, that the majority of dwelling units in Watts are single-family structures and that the streets and lawns are well kept for a poverty area.

This is not to conclude that housing in south central Los Angeles is superb. On the contrary, residents of south central Los Angeles live in conditions inferior to the citywide average and, of course, markedly inferior to the newer sections in West Los Angeles. Structures are older and more of them are sub-standard. Population density is higher; in Watts, for example, there is an average of 4.3 persons per household, compared with an overall county average of 2.94 persons per household.

Much has been done in the past ten or fifteen years to improve the situation. For example, we have been informed that a survey of Watts by the city's Department of Building and Safety resulted in the removal of 2,104 dwelling units which were too dilapidated for occupancy. The Department of Building and Safety states that only three percent of dwelling units now existing in the curfew zone can be classified as dilapidated.

Nor has Los Angeles failed to provide the curfew area with an equal share of public facilities and services. Thirty-nine recreational facilities exist within the area — ten operated by Los Angeles County and the remainder, including nine swimming pools, operated by the city. We are informed that the construction and maintenance of streets in the curfew zone is roughly comparable with that of the total county, as is refuse collection and sanitation. Street lighting meets minimum standards, although it is not as good as in some other areas. City officials inform us that this disparity exists because the lighting may be increased at the request of property owners and merchants in an area, who must agree to be assessed for the extra costs.

#### A serious deterioration

Nevertheless, we have received extensive testimony expressing residents' dissatisfaction with the area's physical facilities. Of particular concern to us is the fact that a serious deterioration of the area is in

progress. Houses are old and require constant maintenance if they are to remain habitable. Over two-thirds of them are owned by absentee landlords. In numerous instances neither landlords nor tenants appear willing to join in a cooperative effort to halt the deterioration. Many landlords are faced with problems of a high turnover in tenants who do not consider themselves responsible for assisting to maintain the property. Tenants resent the high proportion of their income which they must devote to rent for shelter which in many instances is more deteriorated than housing in the total county.

Compounding the problem is the fact that both private financial institutions and the Federal Housing Authority consider the residential multiple unit in the curfew area an unattractive market because of difficult collection problems, high maintenance costs, and a generally depreciating area resulting from the age of surrounding structures. Moreover, unlike cities such as New Haven, Connecticut, private groups have not taken full advantage of the numerous federally supported programs designed to assist the construction of low-cost housing. At the same time, the development of public housing has been limited by the failure of voters to approve governmental development of low-cost housing, as required by the California Constitution.

In view of the deterioration of the area, the Commission urges the implementation of a continuing urban rehabilitation and renewal program for south central Los Angeles. We look with gratification upon the recent action of the City Council in approving an application by the city for federal assistance under the Community Analysis Program to develop and implement a Master Plan.

Nevertheless, all action cannot wait until the completion of the study and, to this end, private non-profit organizations such as churches and unions should be encouraged to sponsor low-cost housing under section 221(d)(3) of the National Housing Act and similar statutes.

The experience of other cities tentatively indicates the possibility that such projects can be integrated if coordinated with a program which rehabilitates the surrounding neighborhood and insures that good schools are available.

We also urge that the regulations of the Federal Housing Authority be revised so as to liberalize credit and area requirements for FHA-insured loans in disadvantaged areas. This would encourage residents to rehabilitate as well as to acquire property in the area. Similarly, we urge that the regulations applicable to savings and loan institutions be revised in order to offer an incentive to such institutions to participate in financing the purchase, development, and rehabilitation of blighted areas.

The Commission also urges that one county-wide "data bank" be created to centralize and standardize the information and statistics which numerous federal, state and local agencies collect concerning various areas of the county. At present no coordinating unit exists, and each agency collects information on geographic, time, and methodological considerations which have little relevance to the considerations employed by other agencies. The result is needless waste, duplication, and confusion, since it is often impossible to correlate one agency's figures with another's.

## A SUMMING UP — THE NEED FOR LEADERSHIP

The study of the Los Angeles riots which we have now completed brought us face to face with the deepening problems that confront America. They are the problems of transition created by three decades of change during which the historical pattern of urban and rural life — which for decades before existed side by side, each complementing and supporting the other — has been violently and irreversibly altered. Modern methods and mechanization of the farm have dramatically, and, in some regards, sadly reduced the need for the farm hand. With this, a drift to the city was the inevitable and necessary result. With respect to the Negro, the drift was first to the urban centers of the South and then, because scanty means of livelihood existed there, on northward and westward to the larger metropolitan centers. It was not the Negro alone who drifted; a substantial part of the entire farm labor force, white and Negro alike, was forced to move and did.

World War II and, to a lesser extent, the Korean War of the early '50's, tended to accelerate the movement, particularly the drift of the Negro from the south to the north. Because job opportunities existed in the war plants located in our cities, the deep and provocative problem created by the movement was not at first appreciated by society. Since then, caught up in almost a decade of struggle with civil rights and its related problems, most of America focused its attention upon the problem of the South — and only a few turned their attention and thoughts to the explosive situation of our cities.

But the conditions of life in the urban north and west were sadly disappointing to the rural newcomer, particularly the Negro. Totally untrained, he was qualified only for jobs calling for the lesser skills and these he secured and held onto with great difficulty. Even the

jobs he found in the city soon began to disappear as the mechanization of industry took over, as it has since the war, and wiped out one task after another — the only tasks the untrained Negro was equipped to fill.

Hence, equality of opportunity, a privilege he sought and expected, proved more of an illusion than a fact. The Negro found that he entered the competitive life of the city with very real handicaps: he lacked education, training, and experience, and his handicaps were aggravated by racial barriers which were more traditional than legal. He found himself, for reasons for which he had no responsibility and over which he had no control, in a situation in which providing a livelihood for himself and his family was most difficult and at times desperate. Thus, with the passage of time, altogether too often the rural Negro who has come to the city sinks into despair. And many of the younger generation, coming on in great numbers, inherit this feeling but seek release, not in apathy, but in ways which, if allowed to run unchecked, offer nothing but tragedy to America.

Realizing this, our Commission has made, in this report, many costly and extreme recommendations. We make them because we are convinced the Negro can no longer exist, as he has, with the disadvantages which separate him from the rest of society, deprive him of employment, and cause him to drift aimlessly through life.

This, we feel, represents a crisis in our country. In this report, we describe the reasons and recommend remedies, such as establishment of a special school program, creation of training courses, and correction of misunderstandings involving law enforcement. Yet to do all of these things and spend the sums involved will all be for naught unless the conscience of the community, the white and the Negro community together, directs a new and, we believe, revolutionary attitude towards the problems of our city.

This demands a form of leadership that we have not found. The time for bitter recriminations is past. It must be replaced by thoughtful efforts on the part of all to solve the deepening problems that threaten the foundations of our society.

**Government.** Government authorities have done much and have been generous in their efforts to help the Negro find his place in our society and in our economy. But what has been done is but a beginning and sadly has not always reached those for whom it was intended in time and in a meaningful way. Programs must not be oversold and exaggerated, on the one hand, or unnecessarily delayed on the other. What we urge is a submersion of personal ambition either political or bureaucratic, in the interest of doing the most good and creating the best results from each and every dollar spent in existing programs.

With particular respect to the City of Los Angeles, we urge the immediate creation of a City Human Relations Commission, endowed with clear cut responsibility, properly staffed and adequately funded. We envisage a commission composed of a chairman and six members with special competence in the fields of research, employment, housing, education, law, youth problems and community organizations. This City Commission should develop comprehensive educational programs designed to enlist the cooperation of all groups, both public and private, in eliminating prejudice and discrimination in employment, housing, education, and public accommodations.

**Business and Labor.** Business leaders have their indispensable role. No longer can the leaders of business discharge their responsibility by merely approving a broadly worded executive order establishing a policy of non-discrimination and equality of opportunity as a basic directive to their managers and personnel departments. They must insist that these policies are carried out and they must keep records to see

that they are. Also, they must authorize the necessary facilities for employment and training, properly designed to encourage the employment of Negroes and Mexican-Americans, rather than follow a course which all too often appears to place almost insurmountable hurdles in the path of the Negro or Mexican-American seeking a job. Directly and through the Chamber of Commerce, the Merchants and Manufacturers Association, and other associations, the business leader can play a most important role in helping to solve the crisis in our cities.

Labor unions have their very vital role. Union leaders must be resolute in their determination to eliminate discrimination and provide equality of opportunity for all within spheres of their jurisdiction and influence. For one reason or another, the records of the ethnic mix of the membership of many unions have not been furnished despite our repeated requests. In labor, as in business, pronouncements of policy, however well intended, are not enough. Unless a union conducts its affairs on a basis of absolute equality of opportunity and non-discrimination, we believe there is reason to question its eligibility to represent employees at the bargaining table.

**News Media.** The press, television, and radio can play their part. Good reporting of constructive efforts in the field of race relations will be a major service to the community. We urge all media to report equally the good and the bad — the accomplishments of Negroes as well as the failures; the assistance offered to Negroes by the public and private sectors as well as the rejections.

In our study of the chronology of the riots, we gave considerable attention to the reporting of inflammatory incidents which occurred in the initial stage of the Los Angeles riots. It is understandably easy to report the dramatic and ignore the constructive; yet the highest traditions of a free press involve responsibility as well as drama. We urge that members of all media meet and consider whether there might be

wisdom in the establishment of guide lines, completely voluntary on their part, for reporting of such disasters. Without restricting their essential role of carrying the news to the public fairly and accurately, we believe news media may be able to find a voluntary basis for exercising restraint and prudence in reporting inflammatory incidents. This has been done successfully elsewhere.

**The Negro and the leader.** Finally, we come to the role of the Negro leader and his responsibility to his own people and to the community in which he lives. The signing of the Voting Rights Act by President Johnson in the spring of 1965 climaxed a long and bitter fight over civil rights. To be sure, the civil rights controversy has never been the issue in our community that it has been in the South. However, the accusations of the leaders of the national movement have been picked up by many local voices and have been echoed throughout the Negro community here. As we have said in the opening chapter of this report, the angry exhortations and the resulting disobedience to law in many parts of our nation appear to have contributed importantly to the feeling of rage which made the Los Angeles riots possible. Although the Commission received much thoughtful and constructive testimony from Negro witnesses, we also heard statements of the most extreme and emotional nature. For the most part, our study fails to support — indeed the evidence disproves — most of the statements made by the extremists. We firmly believe that progress towards ameliorating the current wrongs is difficult in an atmosphere pervaded by these extreme statements.

If the recommendations we make are to succeed, the constructive assistance of all Negro leaders is absolutely essential. No amount of money, no amount of effort, no amount of training will raise the disadvantaged Negro to the position he seeks and should have within this community — a position of equality — unless he himself shoulders

a full share of the responsibility for his own well being. The efforts of the Negro leaders, and there are many able and dedicated ones among us, should be directed toward urging and exhorting their followers to this end.\*

The Commission recognizes that much of what it has to say about causes and remedies is not new, although it is backed up by fresh additional evidence coming out of the investigation of the Los Angeles riots. At the same time, the Commission believes that there is an urgency in solving the problems, old or new, and that all Americans, whatever their color, must become aware of this urgency. Among the many steps which should be taken to improve the present situation, the Commission affirms again that the three fundamental issues in the urban problems of disadvantaged minorities are: employment, education and police-community relations. Accordingly, the Commission looks upon its recommendations in these three areas as the heart of its plea and the City's best hope.

As we have said earlier in this report, there is no immediate remedy for the problems of the Negro and other disadvantaged in our community. The problems are deep and the remedies are costly and will take time. However, through the implementation of the programs we propose, with the dedication we discuss, and with the leadership we call for from all, our Commission states without dissent, that the tragic violence that occurred during the six days of August will not be repeated.

\* A comment regarding this by the Rev. James Edward Jones is set forth at p. 87 infra.

## COMMENTS OF THE REV. JAMES EDWARD JONES

1. There is the observation at the top of page 71 that the generality of California welfare programs encourage heavy immigration of disadvantaged peoples to the Los Angeles area. I have been unable to find statistics to justify this statement and violently disagree with this unjustifiable projection. The report has also stated that Negroes like other disadvantaged peoples have come to Los Angeles to seek the better opportunities offered in an urban area. Welfare programs discourage immigration to receive public assistance because new arrivals cannot qualify for aid with less than one year of residence. Have other immigrants come to Los Angeles to get on welfare rolls or rather to find job opportunities? I am sure that statistics bear out my observation rather than that which appears in the report.
2. I do not believe it is the function of this Commission to put a lid on protest registered by those sweltering in ghettos of the urban areas of our country. We speak of the malaise in our cities and in our society in general. We also recognize in our report that "The Negro found that he entered the competitive life of the city with very real handicaps: he lacked education, training, and experience, and his handicaps were aggravated by racial barriers which were more traditional than legal. He found himself, for reasons for which he had no responsibility and over which he had no control, in a situation in which providing a livelihood for himself and his family was most difficult and at times desperate. Thus, with the passage of time, altogether too often the rural Negro who has come to the city sinks into despair." Yet the report concludes that all of the ameliorating efforts — such as education and other governmental programs — will be of no avail unless he helps himself. It is true that you cannot make a musician out of a child who is unwilling to learn, even though you provide the best teachers and the best instruments. But it must be remembered in



dealing with the member of a disadvantaged minority who has never heard music or seen a musical instrument that he must be motivated to help himself. Therefore, he has a right to protest when circumstances do not allow him to participate in the mainstream of American society. Protest against forces which reduce individuals to second-class citizens, political, cultural, and psychological nonentities, are part of the celebrated American tradition. As long as an individual "stands outside looking in" he is not part of that society; that society cannot say that he does not have a right to protest, nor can it say that he must shoulder a responsibility which he has never been given an opportunity to assume.

## APPENDIX

### STAFF

#### GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES RIOTS

Thomas R. Sheridan  
*General Counsel and Executive Director*

Harold W. Horowitz  
*Deputy General Counsel*

#### *Community Liaison*

C. Joseph Bride, Jr.

#### *Program Manager*

Marvin Adelson

#### *Staff Attorneys*

Yvonne Brathwaite

Alice Campbell

Benjamin S. Farber

John A. Joannes

John A. Mitchell

Kevin O'Connell

Gerald L. Rosen

James S. White

Samuel L. Williams

#### *Staff Investigators*

Logan Lane, *Chief*

Alfred V. Branche

David A. Butterfield

William W. Colby

Jerry Curtis

Loring D. Emile

William C. Gilkey

Kenneth V. Hansen

Malcolm P. Richards

Carl W. Wullschlager

#### *Research Associates*

Renée A. Copes

William K. Salstrom

#### *Research Assistants*

Justine McCarthy

Judith R. Nelson

Audrey Oliver

Terence M. Lee

*Secretary to the Commission*

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- Norman Abrams, Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles
- James N. Adler, Attorney at Law
- Robert Blauner, Assistant Professor of Sociology, University of California, Berkeley
- John C. Bollens, Professor of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles
- Joseph Boskin, Associate Professor of History, University of Southern California
- Paul Bullock, Research Economist, University of California, Los Angeles
- Francis M. Carney, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of California, Riverside
- Fred E. Case, Professor of Business Administration, University of California, Los Angeles
- John M. Chapman, Professor of Epidemiology, University of California, Los Angeles
- Michael E. DePrano, Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Southern California
- Betty M. Edmondson, Psychiatric Social Worker, County General Hospital, Los Angeles
- Frances L. Feldman, Associate Professor of Social Work, University of Southern California
- M. Michael Feuers, Sociologist, System Development Corporation

- Walter A. Fogel, Assistant Professor of Business Administration, University of California, Los Angeles
- Maxwell E. Greenberg, Attorney at Law
- Kent M. Lloyd, Assistant Professor of Public Administration, University of Southern California
- Kenneth A. Martyn, Professor of Special Education, California State College at Los Angeles
- Jeffrey B. Nugent, Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Southern California
- E. Edward Ransford, Graduate Student, Department of Sociology, University of California, Los Angeles
- Leo G. Reeder, Associate Professor of Public Health, University of California, Los Angeles
- William L. Rivers, Associate Professor of Communication, Stanford University
- Milton Roemer, Professor of Public Health, University of California, Los Angeles
- Melvin Seeman, Professor of Sociology, University of California, Los Angeles
- Harold W. Solomon, Associate Professor of Law, University of Southern California
- Henry J. Steinman, Attorney at Law
- Irwin R. Sternlicht, Clinical Psychologist, System Development Corporation

**Clerical and Secretarial**

Betty Barnett, *Secretary to Mr. McCone*  
June Perkins, *Secretary to Mr. Sheridan*

Hank Ares  
Nancy J. Bell  
Carrie E. Blanchard  
Joanne Burnside  
Barbara Christiansen  
Shirley Doyle  
Chris Duda

Lucy Fidchina  
Sue Heard  
Martha Hubbard  
Eleanor Navickas  
Mary Stave  
Lucy Woods

Nelson & Amack  
*Official Reporters*

**ALPHABETICAL LIST OF SWORN WITNESSES**

Anderson, Glenn M.	Lieutenant Governor, State of California
Atkinson, Herb	Vice-President, Atkinson Transportation Co. and South Los Angeles Transportation Co.
Billett, John W.	Administrative Assistant to the Executive Secretary to the Governor, State of California
Bradley, Thomas	Councilman, 10th District, City of Los Angeles
Brazier, Wesley R.	Executive Director, Los Angeles Urban League
Brookins, Reverend H. Hartford	Chairman, United Civil Rights Committee and Pastor, First AME Church of Los Angeles
Brown, Edmund G.	Governor, State of California
Brown, Willie F.	Resident of Compton since 1940
Brunton, George E.	Division Fire Chief, Fire Department, County of Los Angeles
Bryant, Miss Linda	Student, David Starr Jordan High School in Watts, President of Student Committee for Improvement in Watts
Buggs, John A.	Executor Director, Los Angeles County Commission on Human Relations

Champion, Hale  
 Director, Department of Finance, State of California

Christian, Winslow  
 Executive Secretary to the Governor, State of California

Claybrook, Harvey  
 Accountant, formerly employed at Martin's Department Store, in Watts

Collins, Wendell  
 First Vice-Chairman, Congress of Racial Equality

Colwell, Capt. Walter C.  
 Commander, Internal Affairs Division, Department of Police, City of Los Angeles

Cray, Ed  
 Representative of the American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California

Crittenden, Bradford  
 Administrator, Public Safety Agency and Commissioner, California Highway Patrol

Crowther, Jack P.  
 Superintendent of Los Angeles City School District

Dorn, Warren M.  
 Supervisor, 5th District, Los Angeles County

Downey, James F.  
 Undersheriff, Sheriff's Department, County of Los Angeles

Dymally, Mervyn M.  
 Assemblyman, 53rd District, State of California

Lieberhardt, Jack L.  
 Sergeant, Manuals and Order Section of Planning and Research Division, Department of Police, City of Los Angeles

Ferraro, John  
 President, Board of Police Commissioners, City of Los Angeles

Fisher, Hugo  
 Administrator, Resources Agency, State of California

Fisk, James G.  
 Administrative Inspector, and Coordinator of Community Relations Activities, Department of Police, City of Los Angeles

Forniss, Mrs. Mary Ann  
 Resident of Watts

Gibson, John S. Jr.  
 Councilman, 15th District, City of Los Angeles

Gonzague, Mrs. Ozie  
 Watts resident for 22 years

Gordon, Milton G.  
 Real Estate Commissioner and Administrator, Business and Commerce Agency, State of California

Gregg, Mrs. Jean  
 Executive Director, Crenshaw Neighbors, Inc.

Guzman, Ralph  
 Assistant Director, Mexican-American Study Project, University of California at Los Angeles

Haas, Lucien C. Associate Press Secretary to the Governor, State of California

Hahn, Kenneth Supervisor, 2nd District, County of Los Angeles

Hawkins, Augustus F. Congressman, 21st Congressional District, State of California

Hill, Raymond M. Administrative Deputy Chief, Los Angeles Fire Department

Hill, Lt. General Roderic L. Adjutant General, State of California and Commander, California National Guard

Houston, Norman B. President, Los Angeles Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People

Ingram, William K. Chief of Police, Compton, California

Jasich, Antone P. Captain, Arson Bureau, Los Angeles Fire Department

Johnson, Mrs. Freita Shaw President, Will Frandel Ladies Club of Watts

Jones, Mrs. Opal C. Director, Neighborhood Adult Participation Project

Kline, Richard Staff Secretary to Governor Brown for Southern California

Lewis, Murray A. Secretary, Management Committee, Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce

Lynch, Thomas C. Attorney General, State of California

McClellan, H. C. Chairman, Rehabilitation Committee, Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce

Maldonado, Joe P. Executive Director, Economic and Youth Opportunities Agency of Greater Los Angeles

Miller, Loren Judge, Los Angeles Municipal Courts; Vice-President, National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing

Mills, Billy G. Councilman, 8th District, City of Los Angeles

Monning, Major General John C. General Manager and Superintendent of Building, Department of Building and Safety, City of Los Angeles

Monroe, Eason Executive Director, American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California

Mont, Max Assistant to the Executive Secretary-Treasurer of the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor, AFL-CIO

Morse, Mrs. Muriel M.  
 General Manager, Civil Service Department, City of Los Angeles

Muntz, Harold R.  
 Chief Deputy Probation Officer, Probation Department, County of Los Angeles

Murdock, Roger E.  
 Deputy Chief of Police  
 Commander, Patrol Bureau, Department of Police, City of Los Angeles

Murphy, Ellis P.  
 Director, Bureau of Public Assistance, Department of Charities, County of Los Angeles

Nelson, Mrs. Helen  
 Consumer Counsel, State of California

Ott, Major General Charles A. Jr.  
 Commanding General of the 40th Armored Division, California National Guard

Parker, William H.  
 Chief of Police, Department of Police, City of Los Angeles

Peery, Benjamin  
 Long-time resident of Watts

Pitchess, Peter J.  
 Sheriff, Los Angeles County

Purnell, Eugene  
 Secretary of Anti-Poverty Committee, Hodcarriers Union, Local 300

Quick, Colonel Robert L.  
 Colonel, California National Guard

Reddin, Thomas  
 Deputy Chief of Police  
 Commander, Technical Services Bureau, Department of Police, City of Los Angeles

Roybal, Edward R.  
 Congressman, 30th District, State of California

Rubin, Miles  
 Senior Assistant Attorney General, State of California

Schrade, Paul  
 Director, Western Region 6, United Auto Workers, AFL-CIO

Simon, Richard  
 Deputy Chief of Police  
 Commander, Bureau of Administration, Department of Police, City of Los Angeles

Staff, George  
 President, American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California

Slaughter, Winston  
 Compton Junior College Student

Taylor, Dr. Christopher L.  
 Dentist and property owner in riot area

Ward, Paul D.  
 Administrator, Health and Welfare Agency, State of California

Warren, Edward  
 Real estate broker in Watts area

Welch, Miss Sue

Former schoolteacher at  
Markham Junior High School  
in Watts

Williams, Mrs. Annabelle

Coordinator of Imperial  
Gardens Housing Project in  
Watts

Wing, Philip

Athletic Director, Verbum Dei  
High School in Watts

Wirin, A. L.

Counsel for American Civil  
Liberties Union of Southern  
California

Younger, Evelle J.

District Attorney, County of  
Los Angeles


Yorty, Samuel William



Mayor, City of Los Angeles

In addition to the above list of sworn witnesses, the Commission's staff conducted detailed interviews of several hundred witnesses, not only in Los Angeles, but also in other cities throughout the United States, such as Chicago, New Haven, Rochester, Philadelphia, New York, and Washington, D. C. The staff also interviewed some 90 persons arrested during the riots. Further, the Commission's consultants questioned many people and conducted written surveys of some 10,000 persons. The members of the Commission were given detailed reports of the interviews and studies.



The Commission opened and staffed three field offices in South Central Los Angeles where hundreds of local residents and business people were interviewed. Each Commissioner spent many hours in the field offices, and their interviews were written up and furnished to all other Commissioners.

The Commission wishes to acknowledge its debt and express its appreciation to all who so generously shared their knowledge, counsel, and observations with the Commission during its investigation.





THE EVIDENCE. The extensive sniping and looted weapons were a major problem as this collection of seized guns (top) vividly illustrates. The overturned cars (bottom) show the fury of the riot at its peak.






### LEGEND OF THE MAP

The map of the curfew zone in the envelope on the adjacent cover was prepared by the Office of the Chief Administrative Officer of Los Angeles County from data compiled by the Los Angeles Police Department, the Los Angeles Sheriff's Office, and police officials in Pasadena, Long Beach, Pacoima, Compton, and Venice. Although the latter cities are not shown on the map, their figures are included in the totals.

The first category—"damaged and/or burned" buildings—consists of buildings which suffered even minor damage. The second category—"looted" buildings—lists buildings which were looted only, without damage to the building. The third category—"looted, damaged, and/or burned" buildings—is composed of buildings which were both looted and damaged by fire or vandalism but which were not destroyed. The fourth category—"destroyed" buildings—consists of buildings which were destroyed; it is not known if these buildings were also looted.



**BUSINESSES & PRIVATE BUILDINGS**


- DAMAGED AND/OR BURNED \_\_\_\_\_ 275
- LOOTED \_\_\_\_\_ 192
- ⊖ LOOTED, DAMAGED AND/OR BURNED \_\_\_\_\_ 288
- DESTROYED \_\_\_\_\_ 207

**PUBLIC BUILDINGS**

- \* DAMAGED AND/OR BURNED \_\_\_\_\_ 14
- \* DESTROYED \_\_\_\_\_ 1

**TOTAL 977**

○ DEATHS \_\_\_\_\_ 34




City of Los Angeles

Long Beach Police Station

1380 California Ave.  
Long Beach



1326 E. First St.



FRANKLIN DELANO  
ROOSEVELT BANK BLDG  
STREET

WALNUT 7500  
CALIFORNIA 7500  
LIVE OAK 7500  
FLOWER 7500  
OAK 7500  
PINE 7500  
OLIVE 7500